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EXPLODING THE CLASS ACTION AGENCY COSTS MYTH: 
THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL LAWYERS 
MYRIAM GILLES†
GARY B. FRIEDMAN††
INTRODUCTION 
John Coffee observed twenty years ago that “[h]igh agency costs” 
inherent in class action litigation “permit opportunistic behavior by 
attorneys” and, “[a]s a result, it is more accurate to describe the plain-
tiff’s attorney as an independent entrepreneur than as an agent of the 
client.”1  Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller picked up on this 
† Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  Many thanks to participants at 
workshops and conferences held at UCLA, New York Law School, Washington Univer-
sity, Vanderbilt, Princeton, Northwestern, Cardozo, University of Illinois College of 
Law, and Florida State University, and especially to Richard Briffault, Arthur Bryant, 
Edward Cooper, Jill Fisch, Dirk Hartog, Peter Huang, Stan Katz, Liz Magill, Tamir 
Moustafa, Richard Nagareda, Tom Rowe, Bill Rubenstein, Kim Scheppele, Tony Se-
bok, Cathy Sharkey, and Stewart Sterk for careful reading and helpful comments.  All 
errors are our own. 
†† Mr. Friedman has represented both defendants and plaintiffs in class actions, 
and was most recently appointed co-lead counsel in In re American Express Merchants 
Litigation, No. 03 CV 9592 (GBD), 2006 WL 662341 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2006), an anti-
trust class action on behalf of U.S. retailers. 
1 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:  Balancing Fairness 
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882-83 (1987) [hereinafter 
Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation].  Professor Coffee has recently posted a paper in 
which he asserts that “[d]eterrence . . . is the only rationale that can justify the signifi-
cant costs—both public and private—that securities class actions impose on both inves-
tors and the judiciary.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  An Essay 
on Deterrence and Its Implementation 2-3 (Columbia Law. Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Stud-
ies, Working Paper No. 293, 2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Securities Class Action], available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=893833.  Coffee therefore argues that, in order to 
maximize the deterrent function of these cases, “culpable insiders” should be forced to 
pay the greater share of financial damages in securities class actions, rather than im-
posing those costs on the innocent public shareholders of the defendant corporation.  
Id. at 23.  This article bears special note here because we think it represents a radical 
shift in Professor Coffee’s approach to the analysis of class actions, and may therefore 
signal a broader movement in the academy.  In other words, if John Coffee—whose 
influential scholarship in the 1980s spawned a generation of class action skeptics—now 
views class actions (or, at least, securities class actions) as having social utility in the 
form of deterrence and has started to engage the question of how to best implement 
that deterrent power, we are perhaps moving in the right direction.  See, e.g., Edward 
Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Inter-
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theme in a highly influential 1991 article, recognizing that “the single 
most salient characteristic of class and derivative litigation is the exis-
tence of ‘entrepreneurial’ plaintiffs’ attorneys [who, because they] are 
not subject to monitoring by their putative clients . . . operate largely 
according to their own self-interest . . . .”2
Today, these insights have become canonical.  No one doubts that 
class action plaintiffs’ attorneys operate, in reality, as independent en-
trepreneurs guided by self-interest.3  The conventional wisdom fur-
ther posits that there is tremendous social disutility in the fact that 
class actions are “characterized by high agency costs:  that is, a signifi-
cant possibility that litigation decisions will be made in accordance 
with the lawyer’s economic interests rather than those of the class.”4
The conventional wisdom is half right.  Class action plaintiffs’ law-
yers are indeed independent entrepreneurs driven by the desire to 
maximize their gain, even at the expense of class members’ compen-
sation.  Where the conventional wisdom has gone wrong, however, is 
in condemning this as a bad thing and proposing reforms for class ac-
tion practice designed to correct this conflict by increasing the com-
pensation of absent class members. 
In fact, as we will show, the so-called “agency cost” problem is 
mostly a mirage.  So far as the vast majority of small-claims class ac-
tions go,5 concerns with the undercompensation of absent class mem-
vention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919, 1925 (2000) (“Two distinct periods of policy analysis re-
garding the class action exist.  The first era set out the structure for a positive role for 
the class suit.  In great contrast, a second wave of class action thinking, led by Professor 
Coffee, provided a negative critique of the class action device . . . .”).  Perhaps a third 
wave has started to form.
2 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Ac-
tion and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991). 
3 See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:  How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2088 (1995) (“Most critiques of class actions assume that substantial agency costs 
are unavoidable because no class member has a stake in the litigation large enough to 
justify monitoring the attorneys who represent the class.”). 
4 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 536 (1991). 
5 This Article focuses on small-claims class actions, including virtually all consumer 
class cases, and many claims arising under banking, insurance, and other laws.  In re-
cent years, consumer class actions have “accounted for an increasing share of class ac-
tions [sic] suits.”  Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions:  Who Are the Real Win-
ners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 223 (2004).  High-value claims falling outside the ambit of 
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bers are totally misplaced.  In reality, there is generally no legitimate 
utilitarian reason to care whether class members with small claims get 
compensated at all.  Nor is there any economic reason to fret that en-
trepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers are being overcompensated. 
There is but one true objective here—one valid normative meas-
ure by which to gauge any class action procedure or practice, or any 
proposed reform.  All that matters is whether the practice causes the 
defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.6  
Once this normative polestar is accepted, much of the recent litera-
ture on class actions comes up for reexamination. 
The orthodox school of scholarly criticism in the class action area 
begins its inquiry by focusing on current rules or practices—for ex-
ample, the rules for awarding attorneys’ fees or approving coupon-
based settlements—and then asking whether current practice opti-
mally aligns incentives to serve the ends of compensating absent class 
members.7  This is the wrong question.  Once the appropriate lens of 
deterrence is applied and the objective of internalization understood, 
the scholarly view of many of these rules and practices will change 
dramatically. 
The most critical and controversial feature of this argument is that 
compensation is not really an important goal in small-claims class ac-
tions.  As discussed in detail below,8 we think this conclusion follows 
from several truths and postulates, including (1) many consumer class 
actions concern a trifling per-plaintiff sum, which most class members 
do not care very much about recouping; (2) if the amount at issue is 
worth chasing, the plaintiff may opt out of the class; (3) the right to be 
this Article include many employment, antitrust, and securities actions, and virtually all 
mass tort class actions. 
6 We recognize that there are externalities associated with class action litigation, so 
that forcing the defendant to internalize the full costs of its wrongdoing is not cost-
neutral.  For a more thorough discussion of these externalities and the balancing of 
costs and benefits in small-claims class action litigation, see William Rubenstein, Why 
Enable Litigation?:  A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890303. 
7 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:  The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 726 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attor-
ney] (“[T]he basic goal of reform should be to reduce the agency costs incident to this 
attorney-client relationship.  While various means to this end are possible . . . all should 
be understood as responses to this agency cost problem and debated in that light.”).
8 See infra Part II (arguing that class member compensation should not be the 
primary goal of class suits). 
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represented as a passive class member in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
for damages is not one to which parties attach any meaningful value at 
the time of contracting; and (4) compensating individual small-claims 
class members is simply not what opt-out class actions do well. 
It is not enough to do the hard (or at least counterintuitive) work 
of showing that class member compensation is irrelevant to the formu-
lation of sound class action policy.  We must also do the easy (or at 
least intuitive) work of showing that the deterrence of corporate 
wrongdoing is what we can and should expect from class actions.  But 
does anyone seriously doubt that there is immense deterrent power in 
the contemporary class action?  Executives tempted to lie about earn-
ings are more concerned about Bill Lerach and Melvyn Weiss than 
they are about the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).9  
Companies tempted to skirt fair credit reporting requirements are 
more concerned with ruinous liability at the hands of the class action 
bar than they are with the corrective measures and fines that might be 
meted out following a none-too-likely Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) investigation.10
A distinct question is whether current rules and practices fail to 
provide optimal deterrence, either by forcing corporations to inter-
nalize costs that go beyond those inflicted upon society, or by allowing 
9 See Coffee, Securities Class Action, supra note 1, at 16-17 (suggesting that “securities 
class actions do seem sufficiently pervasive to constitute a deterrent threat for most 
public corporations,” since “between 2.1% and 2.8% of [public companies] have been 
defendants in securities class actions at the start of each year since 1998”); see also Guy 
Halfteck, The Law Enforcement Venture:  Understanding the Effects of Investment in Class Ac-
tions on Corporate Liability Exposure 2 (The John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. at 
Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 452, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=497442 (“The fact that billions of liability dollars are internalized by wrongful 
corporations and other business entities under the aegis of class action litigation and 
settlement evince the intrinsic capacity of the class action mechanism to enforce the 
law . . . .”).
10 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000), is a nice case in 
point:  the FTC in recent years has remained on the sideline of litigation brought by 
the private class action bar against mortgage lenders, banks, and others alleging thou-
sands of violations of FCRA regulations in the distribution of mailers containing “firm 
offer[s] of credit.”  Id. § 1681b(c)(1).  The agency has filed amicus briefs on behalf of 
plaintiffs in these cases, but has otherwise left enforcement of these FCRA provisions 
solely to the private bar.  See Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 
2004) (noting the FTC’s acceptance of the Court’s invitation to submit an amicus 
brief).  Further, statutory damages under the FCRA range from $100 to $1000 per vio-
lation, creating enormous incentives for class counsel to bring these claims.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1). 
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them to escape the full costs of their wrongdoing.11  These are the 
right questions, and we should be asking them at every turn as we ex-
amine particular rules, practices, and reform proposals in the class ac-
tion arena.  As we will show, this deterrence-centric approach can be 
expected to yield significantly different results than the standard in-
quiry in key areas of class action practice, including the rules govern-
ing attorneys’ fees and the standards to be employed in approving set-
tlements. 
In Part I we will canvass the scholarly literature, much of which 
measures class action practices and reform proposals against implicit 
or explicit goals of maximizing class member compensation and 
minimizing “windfall” attorneys’ fees.  We will show that this state of 
“compensationalist” hegemony is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
dating from the 1980s.  Before that, some scholars appear at least to 
have intuited that the true allocative-justice purposes of class actions 
are served by forcing companies to internalize the costs of their ac-
tions, and that the distribution of damages to individual claimants is 
entirely incidental. 
In Part II, then, we will advance the argument that, in assessing 
the efficacy or desirability of class action practices and reform propos-
als, any goal of class member compensation must be utterly disre-
garded in favor of a separate and often competing objective:  forcing 
companies to internalize the social costs of undesirable behavior.  We 
will emphasize that these objectives do in fact compete—that the in-
troduction of compensationalist norms into class action policymaking 
not only is gratuitous, but also undermines the efficacy of many rules 
and practices as deterrents.  The reflexive inclination to service both 
objectives, we argue, is unprincipled and often counterproductive. 
In Part III we draw extensively on real-world class action practice 
to demonstrate how the flawed compensationalist model leads to un-
intended consequences and suboptimal policy choices.  We will focus 
here primarily on the rules governing attorneys’ fee awards.  So, for 
example, we will show how attorneys’ fee rules that are animated by 
the misplaced concern of class member compensation have the unin-
tended consequence of misaligning incentives between class and 
11 For a discussion of suboptimal deterrence in a related context, see Myriam E. 
Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:  The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Reme-
dies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001), which argues that damage awards against government 
officials and their employers effectively deter constitutional violations. 
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counsel.  In fact, such rules ensure that lawyers will settle cases too 
cheaply—or at least, far more cheaply than they would under a set of 
fee rules designed to maximize the defendant’s internalization of 
costs.  In the process, we will also demonstrate that, under the current, 
misguided regime, unethical lawyer activities such as bill-padding and 
overstaffing actually (and perversely) serve to increase class member 
compensation.  We will also briefly discuss two current hot-button is-
sues in class action practice—coupon-based settlements and class ac-
tion waivers12—in order to show that, here too, a deterrence-based 
perspective produces results that diverge from the traditional com-
pensationalist view. 
In Part IV we will address the critique that current legal rules and 
our own reform proposals might overdeter undesirable conduct, that 
is, the concern that the class action device may be (or become) too ef-
fective, and may force corporate defendants to internalize costs that 
exceed the social toll of their undesirable actions.  We will also ad-
dress the underdeterrence concern, focusing on “sell-out” settlement 
deals and reverse auctions.  Concerns about suboptimal deterrence 
are real and important; indeed, we believe these are the principal 
concerns that should be addressed in the context of proposals to re-
form class action rules and practices. 
I.  COMPENSATIONALIST HEGEMONY 
Once upon a time, scholars considered deterrence of future 
wrongdoing the strongest justification for small-claims class action liti-
gation.  Writing in 1941, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield 
warned against restricting the availability of class actions lest we “im-
pair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which underlie much con-
temporary law.”13  Focused as they were on the deterrent, law-
12 See generally Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total De-
mise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 391-412 (2005) [hereinafter 
Gilles, Opting Out of Liability] (discussing the effects of the increasing prevalence of 
contractual class action waivers). 
13 Harry Kalven, Jr., & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941).  Kalven and Rosenfield were not entirely dis-
missive of the class action’s potential to achieve “group redress,” but they were drawn 
more to the immense law enforcement potential of these private suits, particularly 
given the limited resources for enforcement by nascent public agencies in that era.  See 
id. at 715 (noting that private class actions and public administrative enforcement “are 
not as a practical matter in competition with each other, inasmuch as the administra-
tive law alternative is largely non-existent at the moment”); see also id. at 691 (examin-
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enforcement function of class actions, Kalven and Rosenfield were 
naturally untroubled by the practices that so vex modern commenta-
tors: 
It is thus seen that the class suit is a vehicle for paying lawyers hand-
somely to be the champions of semi-public rights. . . . Because of the 
lawyer’s incentive . . . the suit which might not be brought at all because 
the demands on legal skill and time would be disproportionate to the 
original client’s stake can, when turned into a class suit, be brought and 
handled in a manner commensurate with its magnitude.  Thus, the class 
suit as a way of redressing group wrongs is a semi-public remedy adminis-
tered by the lawyer in private practice . . . .
14
The Kalven-Rosenfield understanding of small-claims class actions and 
their core public purposes carried over and intensified during the so-
cial upheavals of the 1960s.  As Judith Resnik has described in great 
depth: 
By the 1960s, lawyers, judges, academics and legislators began to con-
ceive of civil justice as having characteristics readily associated with 
criminal justice and administrative systems:  that it had the potential to 
serve as a venue for enforcement of public norms . . . . Creating incen-
tives for entrepreneurial private actors to use the civil justice system to 
partake in the work of public norm enforcement offered an alternative 
to centralizing power exclusively within government.  [In this moment] 
of hospitality towards regulation . . . and of enthusiasm for entrepre-
neurism, the class action rule was born . . . creating a rule regime under 
which lawyers had incentives to subsidize access to courts for small 
claimants otherwise unattractive to the contingency fee bar.
15
In recent years, participants, “practitioners[,] and scholars have 
told different stories about the forces that motivated the 1966 revision 
ing the primary class actions of their day—shareholder derivative suits—and finding a 
“general agreement that [the class action] furnishes the major sanction behind the 
fiduciary rules of corporation law”); Judith Resnik, Money Matters:  Judicial Market Inter-
ventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litiga-
tion, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2000) (“New Deal regulations had focused on the 
utility of statutory protections for consumers and the desirability of the federal courts 
as a forum for redress . . . . Ambivalence about how much government actors could 
and should do also prompted interest in class action litigation.”). 
14 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 717. 
15 Resnik, supra note 13, at 2144-46; see also CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:  PURSUING 
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 12 (Deborah H. Hensler et al. eds., 2000) (noting 
that, according to members of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, “the committee’s deliberations were powerfully affected by the social up-
heavals of the 1960s”). 
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of Rule 23”;16 still, it seems fair to say that the Advisory Committee was 
influenced by the social upheavals of the period and the potential of 
collective litigation to provide access to justice for small-claims victims 
of widespread wrongdoing.17  As one former committee member re-
called to Deborah Hensler, the amendment was infused with “[a] 
spirit of them versus us, of exploiters who must not exploit the whole 
population, of a fairly simplistic good guy-bad guy outlook on the 
world . . . .”18  Simultaneously during this period, the concept of the 
“private attorney general” was gaining momentum,19 adding to the 
perception that litigation could achieve important social goals.20
In the late 1960s and 1970s, scholars picked up on the deterrence-
based rationale to class actions, seeking ways to study and evaluate this 
emerging model of private law enforcement.21  In the 1972 first edi-
16 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 12. 
17 Id.; see also William T. Allen, Commentary on the Limits of Compensation and Deter-
rence in Legal Remedies, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 67, 73 (“The wide-
spread adoption of the 1966 federal amendments to the class action rule presents the 
most obvious and important example of a legal innovation that has the effect of mak-
ing the compensatory remedy a more effective deterrent.”).
18 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 (quoting John P. Frank, Response to 1996 
Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions:  Memorandum to My Friends on the 
Civil Rules Committee (Dec. 20, 1996), in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2 
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED  
AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23, 266 (1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
WorkingPapersVol2.pdf).  According to Hensler, Frank, a member of the Advisory 
Committee that revised Rule 23, believed “the committee’s deliberations were power-
fully affected by the social upheavals of the 1960s,” while William T. Coleman, another 
committee member, rejected “the implication that the 1966 Committee intended to 
facilitate ‘private attorneys general’ class actions.”  Id. at 12, 37 n.13; see also Sherman, 
supra note 5, at 236 (“In the 1970s and 1980s, [the class action] was the workhorse of 
institutional reform in civil rights and statutory or constitutional remedy litigation.”). 
19 See Resnik, supra note 13, at 2139 (observing that in the 1960s and 1970s some 
judges began to require “losing defendants to pay victorious plaintiffs’ fees and costs 
based on the view that such private rights enforcement benefited the public and hence 
that such ‘private attorneys general’ should be compensated by those whom they sued” 
(citations omitted)); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (justifying 
a private cause of action for violation of SEC proxy solicitation rules on the ground 
that “[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to” 
SEC actions, and thus deters future wrongdoing). 
20 See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—And 
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133-37 (2004) (sketching the history of the pri-
vate attorney general concept, and demonstrating that the phrase began to appear 
with greater frequency in judicial decisions and legal commentary beginning in the 
late 1960s). 
21 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 39 n.38 (citing Thomas M. Jones, An 
Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 
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tion of his seminal Economic Analysis of the Law, Richard Posner ob-
served of class actions that “the most important point, from an eco-
nomic perspective, is that the violator be confronted with the costs of 
his violation—this achieves the allocative purpose of the suit—not that 
he pays them to his victims.”22  Posner further asserted that “the im-
portance of receipt of damages by the injured party to motivate him to 
operate the legal machinery is inapplicable here, since the stakes are 
too small to induce any victim to bear any of the burden of obtaining 
legal redress.”23  Posner’s views in this regard were largely echoed by 
other influential scholars in the 1970s, including Kenneth Dam and 
Arthur Miller.24
Things began to change by the early 1980s, which saw the public 
emergence of a plaintiffs’ class action bar—a group of lawyers willing 
1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. REV. 306 (1980) and Barbara Ann Banoff & Benjamin S. DuVal, 
Jr., The Class Action as a Mechanism for Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws:  An Empirical 
Study of the Burdens Imposed, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1984) as examples of empirical studies 
undertaken in the 1970s evaluating the deterrence rationale); Gerald A. Wright, Note, 
The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383, 411-18 (1969) (analyz-
ing class action cases since the 1966 Rule 23 revisions and concluding that class suits 
deter companies from wrongdoing by making it possible for those affected by the 
wrongdoing to hold companies economically liable). 
22 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 349-50 (1972); see also 
Halfteck, supra note 9, at 34 n.101 (noting that “the ex ante expectations of potential 
wrongdoers regarding the magnitude of the ex post threat of liability—indeed, the 
only relevant perspective from a standpoint of deterrence—are solely geared toward 
the average magnitude of damages; the accurate distribution of damages among indi-
vidual victims is entirely irrelevant”); William D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements:  A 
Special Form of Collusion in Class Action Settlements, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 816 (2003) (cit-
ing Posner’s economic rationale). 
23 POSNER, supra note 22, at 350. 
24 See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:  Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Con-
flict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 73 (1975) (concluding that the class action serves 
the deterrence purpose when “the individual claims are too small to make actual com-
pensation of the class members financially feasible”); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein 
Monsters and Shining Knights:  Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 664, 666 (1979) (asserting that empirical evidence suggests that the 1966 amend-
ments to Rule 23 resulted in some deterrence).  But even as early as the 1970s, a hand-
ful of legal scholars were beginning to question the social utility of class action litiga-
tion.  See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients:  Attorney Fees From Funds, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1608 (1974) (observing that the common fund concept allows 
individuals to free ride on attorneys’ efforts and “reap where they have not sown”); 
Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation:  Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 
199 (1976) (asserting that class actions undermine the judicial process); William 
Simon, Class Actions:  Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973) (suggest-
ing that, on balance, the harms of class action litigation outweigh any social benefit).
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and able to take on complex and risky cases.25  This embryonic plain-
tiffs’ class action bar “pooled resources and aggressively shaped litiga-
tion across many enterprises and industries,”26 in fields including anti-
trust,27 consumer welfare,28 environmental,29 and, of course, securities 
law.30
But the dominant public narrative to emerge from these devel-
opments did not focus on the resourcefulness and creativity of these 
legal entrepreneurs, who had managed to realize the deterrent poten-
tial of class actions by responding to the private incentives built into 
the class action device.  Instead, the leading stories discussed large 
fees awarded to class action lawyers31 and complaints of “legal black-
mail” from settling defendants.32
25 See generally Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, Third Circuit 
Task Force Report on the Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340, 343 n.8 (2002) [herein-
after Class Counsel Report] (citing Jill E. Fisch, Aggregations, Auctions and Other Develop-
ments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 56) (“[C]lass actions have led to the evolution of entre-
preneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers, who play a central role in rendering the class action a 
meaningful vehicle for compensating victims and deterring wrongful conduct.”); Cof-
fee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7 (describing the emergence of an 
efficiency-enhancing plaintiffs’ class action bar in securities fraud litigation).
26 Sherman, supra note 5, at 236; see also Resnik, supra note 13, at 2146 (“By aggre-
gating many small claims together and establishing their legal validity, the victorious 
lawyer could garnish significant fees through the equitable common fund doctrine.  
Further, by creating such economic incentives, civil rulemakers helped to develop a 
cadre of lawyers (some of whom had gained expertise with regulatory regimes by work-
ing for the government) with specialized abilities, thereby making somewhat more 
level the playing field of civil justice when the class action rule was applied.”). 
27 See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
28 See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. 1981). 
29 See, e.g., Ouellette v. Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
30 See, e.g., In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 551, 1988 WL 
44682 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 1988); In re Pepsico Sec. Litig., 82 CIV. 8403, 1985 WL 
44682 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1985); In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 607 F. Supp. 1312 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
31 See generally HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 15-19 (reviewing popular and busi-
ness press stories on class actions in the 1970s, which were universally negative towards 
these lawsuits and suspicious of the lawyers who brought them); see also In re Fine Paper 
Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 751 F.2d 562 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (finding that class counsels’ fee applications were “grossly excessive on their 
face and, regrettably, lend substance to the widely-held and mostly unfavorable impres-
sions of the plaintiffs’ class action bar, sometimes referred to as the class action indus-
try”); Ruth Simon, A “Chill” on Class Actions?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 3 (reporting 
on the Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, a $50 million class action where a judge im-
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Meanwhile, back in legal academia, the dominant story was agency 
costs.33  Beginning with John Coffee’s pioneering work in the mid-
1980s,34 law and economics scholars began to critically examine the 
powerful financial incentives of entrepreneurial class action lawyers, 
concluding that many of the problems that inhered in representative 
litigation derived from a misalignment of incentives between lawyers 
and the class.35  Because small-claims class members generally “have so 
little at stake and/or lack such information and expertise that they do 
not have the incentive or capacity to monitor” their lawyers, contem-
porary class actions are “characterized by a rent-seeking entrepreneur 
pursuing her own interests with little oversight by her principals.”36  
Plaintiffs’ class action lawyers therefore “operate with nearly total 
posed “unusually harsh penalties and strong criticism” on the plaintiffs’ lawyers for 
purposely overstaffing the case and submitting a grossly excessive fee request). 
32 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 33 (discussing the reaction of busi-
nesspeople to the burgeoning class action industry). 
33 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 1, at 1925 (“Two distinct periods of policy analysis 
regarding the class action exist.  The first era set out the structure for a positive role for 
the class suit.  In great contrast, a second wave of class action thinking, led by Professor 
Coffee, provided a negative critique of the class action device that appears to have 
worked its way into the court system.”); see also Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 2163 (ob-
serving that, beginning in the 1980s, “Professor Coffee specifically, and law and eco-
nomics scholars more generally, proposed rules that sought to reduce agency costs by 
better align[ing] the interests of the plaintiff’s attorney with those of the class mem-
bers she represented”) (quotation marks omitted).
34 See, e.g., Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 1; John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescu-
ing the Private Attorney General:  Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Work-
ing, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 220-21 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney 
General] (arguing that the incentives offered to the private attorney general are inade-
quate and counterproductive in terms of the social interests purportedly served by pri-
vate enforcement); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action:  A Policy Primer on Re-
form, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 626 (1987) (evaluating the incentive structure of large class 
actions); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7. 
35 See, e.g., Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 1, at 879 (noting, for exam-
ple, that the economic self-interest of plaintiffs’ attorneys can lead to a settlement in 
which all plaintiffs’ claims are treated the same); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 19 
(observing that normal “bonding and incentive techniques are much less effective” in 
class action litigation than in traditional litigation); Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in 
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1191-93 (1982) (arguing that Rule 23’s vague re-
quirement that counsel “adequately protect” the interests of class members has led to 
problems in effective representation); see also Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 2136-38, 
2163 (describing how, in the 1980s, law and economics scholars such as John Coffee 
introduced the concept of agency costs and private entrepreneurial incentives into the 
debates over class actions). 
36 Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 2162-63. 
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freedom,”37 making decisions “largely according to their own self-
interest”38 rather than the interests of class members.39
“Implicit in the assertion that class actions are characterized by 
high agency costs is the assumption that such lawsuits primarily serve 
as a means for claimants to achieve individual ends,”40 particularly 
compensatory ends.  The agency costs argument quite literally is an 
argument that lawyers’ incentives are not set to maximize class com-
pensation.  In this environment of unmanageable agency costs cou-
pled with the lure of high fees, the law and economics scholars ar-
gued, one should reasonably expect entrepreneurial lawyers to engage 
in behavior abusive to the class and detrimental to the goal of com-
pensation.41
In the 1990s, “as damage class actions grew in number and scope, 
both scholarly and public policy discourse on this subject” grew even 
more focused on the “negative outcomes” of reduced class compensa-
tion and high attorneys’ fees.42  John Frank captured a widely held 
concern when he complained that 
[t]he disproportion of the returns to members of the class and the re-
turns to the lawyers who represent them is often grotesque.  In many 
cases, the individual members of the class are entitled to receive at most 
a dollar or two, while the attorney who secured this benefaction for them 
can retire on his share of the victory.
43
37 Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 20. 
38 Id. at 8. 
39 See, e.g., Steve Coll & David A. Vise, Shareholder Lawsuits:  Profitable Path for Attor-
neys, WASH. POST, July 24, 1988, at H1 (referring to profitable class action suits as “a 
game of corporate ambulance chasing”). 
40 Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions From the Bench:  Judging Fiduciaries 
and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1261 (2003). 
41 See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”:  
Alternative Strategies for Damages Class Action Reform,  LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
2001, at 137, 137 (observing that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers may enter into collusive 
settlements “designed in ways that make it unlikely that the defendants will deliver all 
of the benefits that they have pledged to pay class members,” thereby robbing the class 
of compensatory benefits). 
42 Id. at 138; see also Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 
ILL. L. REV. 1477, 1479 & n.19 (describing “all of the publicity surrounding allegations 
of class action abuses” in the 1990s and providing detailed citations to popular and le-
gal articles). 
43 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 83 (quoting John P. Frank, Response to 1996 
Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 Class Actions:  Memorandum to My Friends on the 
Civil Rules Committee, in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2 WORKING PAPERS OF 
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By 1996, these twin concerns of high fees and low compensation 
had reached such a pitch that the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Com-
mittee proposed an amendment to Rule 23(b)(3) that would require 
judges to consider on certification “whether the probable relief to in-
dividual class members justifies the costs and burdens of class litiga-
tion.”44  As Deborah Hensler reports, this proposal generated contro-
versy over what standards judges should employ to make a cost-benefit 
analysis at such an early stage in the litigation, and the Committee ta-
bled any action.45  What is truly staggering, however, is the extent to 
which class compensation concerns had come to dominate the reform 
debate.  Only relief to individual class members has any value; gone 
almost entirely is the original Kalven-Rosenfield understanding of the 
class action and its allocative purpose of forcing the defendant to in-
ternalize social costs. 
By the beginning of the new century, nearly all scholars,46 com-
mentators, and policymakers had become entirely convinced by ar-
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23, at 
277 (1997)).   
44 Hensler & Rowe, supra note 41, at 141 (citing Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 559 (1996)); see also Robert G. Bone, 
Rule 23 Redux:  Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79, 101 (1994) (rec-
ommending that any revision to Rule 23 consider the issue of whether small-claim class 
actions should be allowed).  Other important developments during this period include 
the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was explic-
itly intended to create greater monitoring of class counsel by large, institutional inves-
tors, as well as to regulate attorneys’ fees in securities fraud settlements.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 80-85.
45 Hensler & Rowe, supra note 41, at 143.  But see D. Bruce Hoffman, To Certify or 
Not:  A Modest Proposal for Evaluating the “Superiority” Requirement of a Class Action in the 
Presence of Government Enforcement, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1383, 1388 n.27 (2005) 
(noting that while the proposed cost-benefit amendment “was not adopted . . . some 
courts have taken into account the likely costs of a class action, including attorneys’ 
fees, compared to the likely benefit to claimants,” and citing Pattillo v. Schlesinger, 625 
F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1980), which affirmed the district court’s denial of certification 
because “any claims paid through the class action procedures would be reduced by the 
costs of suit and attorneys’ fees that plaintiffs sought” and because “the principal bene-
ficiaries of the class action would be plaintiffs’ attorneys.”). 
46 Notably, Professor David Rosenberg’s work in mass torts has remained stead-
fastly focused on achieving deterrence through aggregation of claims.  See David 
Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for 
Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1879-80 (2002) (noting the primacy of deterrence as a 
function of class action litigation); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action:  
The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 839 (2002) (arguing that 
mandatory-litigation class actions best deter accidents and secure maximum individual 
welfare). 
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guments that class action abuse radiates from the inherent misalign-
ment of interests between class counsel and class members, as evi-
denced by the exorbitant fees awarded the former at the expense of 
the latter.47
A.  Compensationalism in Contemporary Legal Academia 
The entire agency costs argument derives from, or finds cover in, 
a concern with class member compensation.  The relevant literature is 
teeming with reform proposals aimed at specific features of class ac-
tion practice, guided by the implicit or explicit normative polestar of 
class member compensation. 
So, for example, a number of scholars have championed the auc-
tioning of lead counsel positions in class actions as a means of ensur-
ing that more bread stays on the plaintiffs’ table and less goes to their 
lawyers.48  This literature is explicitly compensationalist:  auctions for 
lead counsel seek to drive down the percent of the fund that counsel 
is willing to accept as a fee, thereby leaving more of the fund to be dis-
tributed among class members.  As such, auctions deemphasize many 
47 See Casey, supra note 40, at 1241 (demanding that policymakers “inquire about 
the results actually achieved for the victims of the fraud”); Christopher R. Leslie, A 
Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litiga-
tion, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1043 (2002) (noting that agency costs encourage class 
counsel to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of the class because “[w]hen 
the attorney has such a substantial financial stake in the outcome of the litigation, the 
class counsel arguably becomes the principal”); Linda A. Willett, Litigation as an Alter-
native to Regulation:  Problems Created by Follow-On Lawsuits with Multiple Outcomes, 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1477, 1491 (2005) (asserting that benefits to class members “are 
likely to be disproportionately reduced by compensation for class counsel, which often 
is obtained at the expense of the lawyers’ own clients”); Mohsen Manesh, Note, The 
New Class Action Rule:  Procedural Reforms in an Ethical Vacuum, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
923, 935 (2005) (claiming that class counsel will “exploit” class members by “structur-
ing a settlement deal to compensate the class counsel generously while leaving class 
members with a recovery of little or no value”). 
48 See, e.g., Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty:  Selection and Monitoring 
of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 71-72 (2004) (proposing a “servantship” 
paradigm in which class counsel are kept loyal to their clients through a bidding 
mechanism); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 106-16 (describing benefits and potential 
problems of auctioning the lead class counsel position); Julie Rubin, Comment, Auc-
tioning Class Actions:  Turning the Tables on Plaintiffs’ Lawyers’ Abuse or Stripping the Plain-
tiff Wizards of Their Curtain, 52 BUS. LAW. 1441, 1442 (2003) (arguing that “the class ac-
tion auction is an alternative that calls for serious experiment”); Analisa Valle, 
Comment, To the Lowest Bidder?  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Auctioning 
the Role of Lead Counsel, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 359, 361 (2003) (concluding that the auc-
tion process is the “best solution” to the problem of lead counsel selection). 
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of the values that guide effective prosecution of claims—experience, 
funds, support of other class counsel49—and catapult one value into 
preeminence:  how little money counsel is willing to accept as a fee.50
Other scholars have focused on the “clientless” nature of many 
contemporary class actions, in which named plaintiffs are incidental 
formalities51 and lawyers really initiate and drive the litigation.52  Most 
prominently, Professor Martin Redish terms these lawyer-driven suits 
“faux class actions” and asserts they are illegal because they are really 
whistleblower or qui tam suits brought under substantive statutes, 
such as antitrust, securities, and consumer laws, in which Congress did 
49 See Class Counsel Report, supra note 25, at 363 n.71 (statement of Sherri R. Savett) 
(“Experience, resources, and other factors such as accessibility, demeanor, reputation, 
etc. are all elements that an individual client takes into consideration in selecting an 
attorney.  It is exceptionally difficult for a court to take these factors into consideration 
when conducting an auction.”); id. at 373 (statement of Samuel Issacharoff) (“The 
auction process fails to take into account the possibility that a higher bidder may have 
factored in more resources to be put into the action, or is simply a higher quality firm, 
thereby increasing the possibility of a higher net class recovery.  The lowest percentage 
bidder may simply be lawyers with lesser overhead, lesser ambition, or volume dis-
counters.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
50 See generally id.  One of the primary reasons the Task Force banished auctions 
from its districts was for fear that the process would not, in the end, maximize the net 
recovery to the class.  As the authors of the report concluded, “the auction system is 
more likely to reward attorneys who can bid the lowest by expending the least in 
prosecution of the class action” and is therefore “not in the best interests of class 
members.”  Id. at 373. 
51 See Richard Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 287, 374 (2003) (observing that “the inherent nature of the class action [is to be] 
a vehicle to govern the legal rights of passive class members who are not parties in a 
conventional sense”); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 61 (asserting that “named 
plaintiffs are—or should be—largely irrelevant in large-scale, small-claim cases and 
should be eliminated”). 
52 See Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements:  The Emperor’s 
Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1345 (2005) (“As a Wall Street 
Journal editorial writer explained, ‘[t]he typical case begins with a lawyer scanning the 
press for some business miscue so small that no single consumer would bother to com-
plain about it.  When thousands of consumers are aggregated in a class action, how-
ever, the prospect of a big fee begins to loom.’  The Des Moines Register further ob-
served that ‘[s]ome lawyers have transformed class actions into a major industry, 
trolling the American marketplace in search of the tiniest flaws in products and ser-
vices for any opportunity to sue.’”); see also Manesh, supra note 47, at 924-25 (“Unlike 
most litigation, where an injured claimant seeks the attorney, in class actions, the at-
torney seeks the claimants.  From the initial investigation of a claim, to class certifica-
tion, and finally settlement, class actions are attorney-driven.  Before there is ever a 
class of plaintiffs, an entrepreneurial attorney investigates potential claims, collects 
facts, recruits an injured plaintiff to serve as the class representative, and files the class 
action.”). 
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not see fit to provide qui tam provisions.53  Redish’s proposal to “weed 
out” clientless class actions is, at bottom, patently compensationalist:  
only actions that are brought on behalf of plaintiffs seeking substantial 
compensation would pass Redish’s test of legitimacy. 
Relatedly, some scholars and observers have argued that Rule 23 
should be amended to provide for opt-in class actions, so that the civil 
justice system can be properly assured of the claimant’s stake in the 
litigation.54  In their view, if small-claims plaintiffs had to opt in to 
class actions, they would serve as better monitors of class counsel and 
be certain to demand the fullest possible compensatory award.55  Here 
again, the literature is explicitly driven by a concern that “clientless 
litigation holds within itself the seeds for questionable practices”56 by 
class action lawyers, namely, reduced compensation to class members.
53 Professor Redish asserts that when a court applies Rule 23 procedures to a sub-
stantive federal statute, it is effectively grafting a qui tam provision onto a law that con-
tains no such remedy.  As such, he argues that Rule 23 should not be applied to lawyer-
driven suits, lest it conflict with the remedial scheme of the substantive congressional 
enactment upon which the suit is based.  Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democ-
ratic Difficulty:  Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77-83; see also CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS 193 
(2002) (citing Professor Lester Brickman as saying that class action lawyers “have in-
vented a formula where they get megabucks . . . for being a super legislature and creat-
ing a policy to their liking without regard to the right of the electorate to make the ul-
timate decisions about public policy”). 
54 See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements:  An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 903, 903 (2005) (proposing a change in the “default rule so that class settle-
ments include only those who . . . opt in”); Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of 
Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 935 (1998) (suggesting various alternatives to cur-
rent class action practice, including a proposal that 23(b)(3) “classes . . . be limited to 
members who affirmatively opt in”); see also Hantler & Norton, supra note 52, at 1343 
(asserting that the 1966 amendment “that reversed an opt-in provision to an opt-out 
provision . . . allows people to be dragooned as plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit unless 
they affirmatively notify the plaintiffs’ attorneys they want out [and that,] as a result, 
countless thousands of plaintiffs can be conscripted into class actions, often unknow-
ingly”). 
55 Related proposals would allow class members numerous opportunities to opt 
out of class actions.  But see generally David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 
23(b)(3) Transactions:  Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 23 (arguing that 
“any opportunity for exit from the class action will undermine not only the anti-
redistribution principle—increasing litigation costs and risks from strategic behavior as 
well as reducing the recoverable wealth that class action scale advantages make possi-
ble—but also the basic deterrence objective of collective adjudication”). 
56 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DI-
LEMMAS:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (1999), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ 
MR969.1/MR969.1.pdf. 
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Other scholars have become sufficiently concerned with the com-
pensatory consequences of entrepreneurial lawyering to recommend 
installing external monitors or guardians ad litem to supervise class 
counsel.57  On Professor Alon Klement’s proposal, for example, the 
candidate who submits the highest bid (i.e., the most she would be 
willing to pay for the monitor position) would be selected and her bid 
“distributed at the court’s discretion either to the class or used to fi-
nance part of the class’s litigation costs.”58  Once the monitor is cho-
sen, she would “supervise class attorneys, set their fee, and oversee 
their conduct in litigation and settlement.”59  For all this hard work, 
the monitor would receive a small percentage of the class recovery.  
Even though this proposal, and others like it, places one more hand 
into the class action pot, it stems from an explicit desire to increase 
overall class member compensation by reducing attorneys’ fees.60
One area that draws more scholarly attention than most is attor-
neys’ fees61—specifically, the issue of how they ought to be deter-
mined.62  Here, until recently, leading scholars found themselves in a 
57 See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians?:  A New Approach for Monitor-
ing Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 28 (2002); see also Eric D. Green, What Will 
We Do When Adjudication Ends?  We’ll Settle in Bunches:  Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-
First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1796-97 (1997) (advocating the early appointment 
of guardians ad litem, by a professor who served as the guardian ad litem for the class 
in Ortiz v. Fibreboard); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:  Georgine v. Am-
chem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1090-92 (1995) (proposing the use of a 
guardian ad litem to protect interests of absent class members against potential collu-
sive behavior by class counsel); Paula B. Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action Litiga-
tion:  The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 327 (1994) (suggesting 
that attorneys could consult with a guardian ad litem for “additional perspective on the 
factors involved”).
58 Klement, supra note 57, at 29. 
59 Id. at 28. 
60 While Professor Klement would pay a third party “the minimum necessary to 
motivate” her to actively monitor class counsel, he believes that the end result would 
be more money for the class itself:  “the price class members would have to pay by 
yielding part of their joint fund would be more than outweighed by their gains from 
adequate supervision of class attorneys’ rents and opportunistic behavior.”  Id. at 29. 
61 In damages class actions, where class members generally have not signed fee 
agreements with counsel prior to the litigation, it is left to judges to determine at the 
end of the case what fees the lawyers will receive from the “common fund.”  As Deb-
orah Hensler notes, “[t]he underlying principle is that all who share in the fund 
should share in paying the class attorney, even though they have not entered into any 
prior agreement to hire and pay this attorney.”  HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 77. 
62 See, e.g., William Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs’ Bar:  Awarding the Attorneys’ Fee 
in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 186 (1994) (describing the controversy 
over methods of determining attorneys’ fee awards); Charles Silver, Unloading the Lode-
GILLES PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006  6:45:01 PM 
120 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 103 
 
 
bit of a pickle:  on the one hand, advocating that class counsel be paid 
a set percentage of the total recovery secured for the class—the “per-
cent-of-fund” approach63—tends to result in formidably high fees; it is 
a staple of the class action literature that “windfall” attorneys’ fees 
pose a problem that needs fixing.64  On the other hand, the tradi-
tional “lodestar” method—under which fees are based on counsel’s 
billed hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, with adjustments 
made by the court based on risk and quality of work65—was roundly 
condemned by leading scholars.66  As Macey and Miller wrote back in 
1991: 
star:  Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865, 869 (1992) (proposing to 
base “fee awards on fee agreements plaintiffs enter into with other lawyers” and to en-
courage “lawyers to offer plaintiffs terms that reflect the market value of the services 
they provide”); see also ARTHUR MILLER, ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS:  A REPORT 
TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 224 (1980) (“Settlements stipulating the size of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees create a potential for conflict between the attorneys’ interest 
in a large fee and the class interest in a large recovery.”); Samuel R. Berger, Court 
Awarded Attorneys’ Fees:  What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 283 (1977) (de-
scribing the “confused and conflicting state of the law” on the question of how to de-
termine reasonable attorneys’ fees). 
63 See Third Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third 
Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 258 (1985) [hereinafter 
Attorney Fees Report] (describing the percent-of-fund approach to fee-setting). 
64 There are literally scores of articles and reports dealing with the perceived 
“windfall” problem.  See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 77 (noting the criticism 
that the [percent-of-fund] method led to “excessive fees that were unrelated to the ac-
tual effort expended by plaintiff class action attorneys”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, 
at 23-24 (noting the “obvious incentive problems” with the percent-of-fund method:  
“plaintiffs’ attorneys will earn windfall profits, at the expense of the class members, in 
cases presenting large damages and low proof costs,” and the method “effectively guar-
antees that plaintiffs’ attorneys will be systematically compensated at a rate higher than 
the rate they would demand in an efficiently functioning competitive market”); Martha 
Pacold, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1007, 1021 (2001) (observing that courts have viewed the percent-of-fund approach as 
“problematic because it generate[s] windfalls for attorneys with exceptionally large 
funds”); see also Attorney Fees Report, supra note 63, at 242 (noting that “[p]ress reaction 
to these [high attorneys’ fee] awards, and criticism from within the profession that the 
fees were disproportionate to the actual efforts expended by the attorneys, generated 
pressure to shift away from the percentage-of-recovery approach”).
65  Klement, supra note 57, at 35 n.27; Attorney Fees Report, supra note 63, at 256. 
66 See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7, at 691 (“By 
severing the fee award from the settlement’s size, [the lodestar] formula facilitates the 
ability of defendants and the plaintiff’s attorneys to arrange collusive settlements that 
exchange a low recovery for a high fee award.”); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Ac-
tions:  Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 667 
(1994) (noting that under the lodestar method of fee-setting lawyers can “pad their 
hours and otherwise engage in unethical activities to enhance their fees”). 
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The lodestar approach has three principal, related defects:  it involves 
enormously burdensome circulation costs; it encourages attorneys to ex-
aggerate their hours; and, because it guarantees that the attorneys will 
receive their fees if successful, it fails to give plaintiffs’ attorneys the 
proper incentive to strike a settlement agreement that maximizes recov-
ery for the plaintiff class.
67
The widely hailed solution to the percent-of-fund versus lodestar 
problem was the so-called “lodestar cross-check,” which really began to 
take hold in the mid-1990s.68  Under this system, the starting point for 
awarding attorneys’ fees is a reasonable percent of the fund created, 
which the court then “cross-checks” against the lawyers’ billing records 
to protect against windfall fees.  As the Third Circuit has explained, 
courts “cross-check the percentage award counsel asks for against the 
lodestar method of awarding fees so as to insure that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
are not receiving an excessive fee at their clients’ expense.”69  As this 
quote emphasizes, the lodestar cross-check—which has now become 
the dominant approach in most federal circuits70—is explicitly rooted 
in the value of promoting class member compensation and minimiz-
ing agency costs. 
These are but a smattering of examples.  Law library shelves sag 
with compensationalist/anti-windfall fees/agency cost-based critiques 
of nearly every aspect of class action practice, including the rules for 
approving settlements,71 particularly coupon-based settlements;72 com-
67 Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 4. 
68 See Vaughn R. Walker & Ben Horwich, The Ethical Imperative of a Lodestar Cross-
Check:  Judicial Misgivings About “Reasonable Percentage” Fees in Common Fund Cases, 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1453, 1454 (2005) (observing that while the percent-of-fund 
model enjoyed a brief recovery in the 1990s, its “revival has in the last decade 
prompted a judicial countermarch in the form of a lodestar cross-check or test of the 
reasonable percentage by reference to reasonable hours and rates”) (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Casey, supra note 40, at 1277, 1302 (describing the prevalence of the 
percent-of-fund approach during the 1990s and the emergence of the lodestar cross-
check in this century). 
69 Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2000). 
70 Walker & Horwich, supra note 68, at 1460 (noting that, “[b]y 2000, the practice 
[of using the cross-check] was apparently routine enough for one district court in the 
Third Circuit to remark that ‘[t]raditionally, the “appropriate” percentage [fee award] 
is . . . subjected to a cross check’” (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 
2d 285, 302 (D.N.J. 2000), vacated 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001); id. at 1463 (observing 
that “48 district court decisions after 2000 . . . applied some form of lodestar cross-
check”). 
71 See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in 
Class Actions:  Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000) (arguing 
that the risks of class action suits settling for far more or far less than they should “can 
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pensating lead plaintiffs;73 and certifying classes,74 among many other 
matters. 
B.  Compensationalism in Congress, the Courts, and Government Agencies 
Policymakers have proven especially receptive to the views of legal 
academics in the class actions area.  The discourse on class action re-
form has been markedly law-professor-driven,75 as prominent scholars 
have testified to and been widely cited by congressional committees,76 
judicial task forces,77 and advisory committees.78
effectively be handled by courts through appropriate class action safeguards”); Geof-
frey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (1987) (ex-
amining the economics of settlement in cases where more than one person has an in-
terest in the claim). 
72 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 994 (2002) (dem-
onstrating how promotional coupon settlements are worthless to many class mem-
bers); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori R. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 98, 98 (analyzing the costs and benefits of nonpe-
cuniary class action settlements). 
73 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167, 169 (“Empowering the class represen-
tative enables the client to exercise greater control over class counsel and the conduct 
of the litigation [and] [t]his should lead to a greater emphasis on recourse and victim 
compensation.”).  But see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to 
Class Action Plaintiffs:  An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1307-08 (2006) (find-
ing, based on a study of 374 class actions, that incentive awards to representative plain-
tiffs were granted in only 28% of settled cases and constituted, when given, on average, 
merely 0.16% of class recovery). 
74 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions:  Aggregation, Amplification, and Distor-
tion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 478-79 (discussing the inherent imperfections of ag-
gregating small claims and combining parties); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  
Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003) (rejecting the ar-
gument that class action defendants are blackmailed into settlements and arguing in-
stead that “[t]he problem, assuming it exists, is excessive pressure resulting in deci-
sions to settle made under duress”).
75 See John Leubsdorf, Co-Opting the Class Action, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1223 
(1995) (describing the class action as “an institution that lawyers and scholars have 
shaped”). 
76 See, e.g., Ten Things We Know and Ten Things We Don’t Know About the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:  Joint Written Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Joseph 
A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino) available at http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
research/articles/19970723sen1.html (discussing the effects of the Reform Act on se-
curities class actions). 
77 See, e.g., Class Counsel Report, supra note 25, at 357 n.38, 399 n.217, 400 n.223, 
402 n.229, 408 n.255 & 412 n.271 (2002) (accepting prepared statements by various 
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Small wonder, then, that the academic preoccupation with class 
member compensation has become the starting and ending point in 
public policy debates over class action reform.  Contemporary political 
debates over class action reform center on two assertions:  that these 
suits are “seriously injuring the consumers that [they] are supposed to 
benefit” by failing to compensate them adequately for their injuries, 
and that “counsels walk off with enormous attorneys’ fees but the class 
members receive next to nothing.”79
Legislative reforms, such as the 1995 Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA)80 and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA),81 have been explicit in their intent to provide more meaning-
ful investor and class member compensation.  Congress enacted the 
PSLRA, over President Clinton’s veto, after hearing copious testimony 
“suggest[ing] that class members recover low percentages of their 
recognized losses in class actions,” and that large institutional inves-
tors “might well be able to generate substantial net benefits by acting 
as litigation monitors.”82  As a result, the PSLRA sought to “overcome 
the concern that securities class actions are ‘lawyer-driven’”83 by re-
law professors, including Arthur Miller, Joseph Grundfest, John Coffee, Elliot Weiss, 
Jill Fisch, and Lucian Bebchuk, in addition to citing extensively from legal scholar-
ship). 
78 Law professors have chaired, testified before, and participated in numerous 
meetings of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  They have also organized in op-
position to various proposed amendments.  See, e.g., Letter from Steering Committee 
To Oppose Proposed Rule 23 to Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler (May 28, 1996), in 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23, at 1 (1997), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol2.pdf. 
79 Class Action Fairness Act of 2001:  Hearing on H.R. 2341 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 37-38 (2002) [hereinafter Class Action Fairness Act Hearing]  
(testimony of John Beisner, partner, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP), available at  
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju7757.000/hju7757_0f.htm. 
80 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
81 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (to be codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
82 Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2089.  The authors, writing in the mid-
1990s, recognized that there had been significant debate over investor compensation 
via securities class action litigation.  See id. at 2089 n.199 (citing conflicting testimony of 
Edward J. Radetich that “recoveries average 13.5455% of investors’ losses” and testi-
mony of class action lawyer William S. Lerach that “claimants receive about 60 percent 
of their recoverable damages”) (internal citations omitted).
83 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:  
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions To Participate 
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 417 (2005); see also Richard H. 
Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action:  Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. 
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quiring that the court appoint as lead plaintiff the representative with 
the “largest financial interest” in the suit84—the assumption being that 
“an investor with a sufficiently large financial stake in the suit will be a 
more diligent monitor than a person with a miniscule claim in the suit 
who may well even have been selected by the suit’s attorney.”85
More recently, supporters of CAFA—for which the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce and other business groups strongly lobbied five sessions 
of Congress before finally succeeding in getting the statute enacted in 
200586—were explicit in their intent to protect class members’ wallets 
from avaricious plaintiff’s lawyers.87  House member Bob Goodlatte, 
who first introduced CAFA in 2001, asserted that the intent of the bill 
was to help “the class member whose claim is extinguished by the set-
tlement, at the expense of counsel seeking to be the one entitled to 
recovery of fees.”88  A Republican-sponsored Senate report echoed 
this view that CAFA would help curb “excessive attorney fee awards 
[that come] at the expense of injured plaintiffs” and would guarantee 
greater judicial oversight of class “settlements [that] consist of ex-
travagant payments to plaintiffs’ attorneys and nothing of real value to 
REV. 641, 642 (1997) (asserting that the “central theme of the legislative history [of the 
PSLRA] is that plaintiffs’ lawyers, rather than faithfully representing investors, were 
acting for their own benefit”). 
84 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb)(West Supp. 2005).  As one commenta-
tor notes: 
In making this appointment, the court is required to take into account the 
size of the financial stake of any potential class representative [which] in-
creases the possibility that a real client with a significant interest in the dispute 
will be involved in the litigation, [and this i]n turn, may offset the self-interest 
of class counsel, who might otherwise be unaccountable. 
Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other People’s Money, 35 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 53, 81 (2004). 
85 Cox & Thomas, supra note 83, at 417. 
86 Sherman, supra note 5, at 230. 
87 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1178 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (observing that “many of today’s class actions are nothing more than business 
opportunities for some lawyers to strike it rich and too often have little, if anything, to 
do with fairly compensating injured class members”); see also John F. Harris & Jim 
VandeHei, Senate Nears Revision of Class Actions, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2005, at A4 (re-
porting on Senator Hatch’s speech denouncing the “jackpot justice” of class action 
litigation and describing a particular case in which “lawyers made $1.5 million suing K-
B Toys, while the plaintiffs got an offer to buy more merchandise at a 30 percent dis-
count”). 
88 Class Action Fairness Act Hearing, supra note 79, at 13 (statement of Rep. Good-
latte). 
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the injured plaintiffs.”89  Corporate defense lawyers showed their con-
cern for plaintiffs, testifying that CAFA was necessary to stop “settle-
ments that provide only nominal benefits to the people who are os-
tensibly being represented—the class members themselves—while 
offering a bonanza in attorneys’ fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.”90  Me-
dia outlets focused their considerable coverage of CAFA on this theme 
as well.91  As other reform bills continue to be presented and debated 
in Congress, it seems clear that legislators will remain susceptible to 
compensationalist arguments.92
The FTC has also focused a great deal of recent attention on class 
compensation and reducing attorneys’ fees, as evidenced by a series of 
new agency directives.  For example, the FTC has started to challenge 
class action settlements by “filing amicus briefs opposing class settle-
ments [where] class relief seems too low or the attorneys’ fees egre-
89 U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., Legislative Notice, S.5—The Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act (Feb. 4, 2005), http://rpc.senate.gov/_files/L1ClassActionSD020405.pdf. 
90 Class Action Fairness Act Hearing, supra note 79, at 50 (testimony of John Beisner). 
91 See, e.g., Editorial, The Class Action Money Chase, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2003, at 18 
(“Federal courts are . . . more likely to dismiss class-action suits.  So it’s no wonder that 
trial lawyers are up in arms about this legislation.”); Editorial, End Lawyers’ Shopping 
Spree, N.Y.DAILYNEWS.COM, Sept. 28, 2003, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
ideas_opinions/v-pfriendly/story/121333p-109159c.html (“Who could be against this 
rational reform?  The trial lawyers’ lobby, that’s who.  The sharks are not about to sur-
render their feeding grounds.  Sens. Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton could have a 
huge impact on the matter, but so far both appear happy in the role of remora.”); 
David McDowell, President Bush Passes Class Action Fairness Act, LEGAL WEEK, Mar. 24, 
2005, http://www.legalweek.net/PrintItem.asp?id=23524 (noting that CAFA seeks to 
“curb class settlements that provide significant fees to class counsel, with marginal 
benefits to class members”); Editorial, Reforming Class Actions, WASH. POST, June 14, 
2003, at A22 (“[N]o area of U.S. civil justice cries out more urgently for reform than 
the high-stakes extortion racket of class actions, in which truly crazy rules permit trial 
lawyers to cash in at the expense of business.”). 
92 For example, Congress recently held hearings on a proposed amendment to the 
PSLRA, the Securities Litigation Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act (H.R. 
5491), which would give judges discretion to auction off the lead counsel position in 
major class actions and to hold losing parties’ attorneys accountable for attorneys’ fees 
in lawsuits deemed frivolous.  See Pamela MacClean, Bidding for Lead Counsel Debated, 
NAT’L L.J., July 17, 2006, at 5.  As Representative Michael Oxley stated in support of 
the bill, “[t]he continuing prevalence of securities lawsuits manufactured by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys for their own benefit is detrimental to companies and their shareholders.  
Our entire economic system . . . pay[s] a high price for frivolous lawsuits that end up 
benefiting attorneys, not plaintiffs.”  See Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
Baker Panel to Advocate Transparency in Securities Litigation (June 22, 2006), avail-
able at http://financialservices.house.gov/News.asp?FormMode=release&ID=818.  
Many view this proposed legislation as a consequence of the Milberg Weiss indictment. 
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giously high.”93  As the chairwoman of the FTC has publicly stated, the 
agency is doubtful whether these settlements “truly serve consumers’ 
interests by providing them appropriate benefits.”94  In this sharp 
break with prior practice,95 the agency during the second Bush admin-
istration96 has challenged class settlements and attorneys’ fees in at 
93 John Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”:  Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1446 (2005) [hereinafter Beisner et al., Class Action Cops]; see also 
Caroline E. Mayer, FTC Seeks to Limit Attorney Fees in Class Action Suits, WASH. POST, Sept. 
30, 2002, at A17 (describing the FTC’s challenge to attorneys’ fees in several proposed 
class action settlements); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Legal Resources:  Amicus Briefs, 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006) (providing links to FTC 
amicus briefs challenging class settlements and proposed attorneys’ fees). 
94 Deborah Platt Majors, Chairwoman of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comments at 
the FTC Workshop:  Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions (Sept. 13, 2004), 
in 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 1162 (2005); see also Mayer, supra note 93, at A17 
(quoting Timothy Muris, the former chairman of FTC, as saying “[o]ur job is to get 
more money to consumers, and by giving attorneys less, we’re giving consumers 
more”); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s Thomas B. Leary Addresses Class 
Action Litigation Summit (June 26, 2003) [hereinafter FTC Press Release], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/fopa/2003/06/learyspeech.htm (“The Commission has used these 
briefs—for example, in In re First Databank and Carter v. IRC Services—to object to exces-
sive attorney fees, which divert needed compensation from injured consumers.”). 
95 The FTC has a long history of filing amicus briefs in both federal and state 
courts on substantive areas of law within its expertise and authority.  See, e.g., Stephen 
Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 627-28 (2001) (sketching the 
history of FTC amicus briefs in the antitrust context).  Only since 2002, however, has 
the agency filed briefs seeking to block private class action settlements.  See Mayer, su-
pra note 93, at A17 (“So far this year, the FTC has challenged attorneys’ fees in three 
proposed class action settlements.”). 
96 The timing of this intervention led Joanne Doroshow, of the Center for Justice 
and Democracy, to opine that the FTC’s actions seem “to dovetail with the political 
agenda of this administration to cut contingency fees of lawyers and discourage class 
lawsuits.”  Mayer, supra note 93, at A17. 
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least six cases97 and seems poised to continue challenging fees in a 
host of pending cases.98
The FTC has also engaged in its own form of lobbying by urging 
the Judicial Conference to amend Rule 23 so as to recommend that 
courts “take into account the existence of related actions conducted 
by the government when calculating awards of attorneys fees.”99  This 
recommendation is based on the agency’s view that there exists a 
“substantial disparity between class counsel’s fee request and class 
members’ recovery,”100 and that this disparity is particularly egregious 
where counsel “piggyback” on the agency’s efforts.101  As an FTC offi-
cial has darkly warned: 
Excessive class action attorney fee awards represent a substantial source 
of consumer harm.  Such fee awards are not a costless windfall to law-
yers, but rather serve to diminish the total compensation available to in-
jured consumers.  To the extent that such fees no longer accurately re-
flect the amount of work performed by the lawyer, or the value of the 
settlement to the class, they may also create distorted incentives, thereby 
97 The FTC intervened in a number of cases to address attorneys’ fee proposals:  
Schneider v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 372, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); In re 
First Databank Antitrust Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2002); Brief for Fed. 
Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae, Carter v. ICR Servs., Inc., No. CV-00-C-2666-W (N.D. 
Ala. Aug. 14, 2002); Intervener Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Motion for Stay and Reconsid-
eration of Order Preliminarily Approving Stipulation of Settlement and Release and 
Class Notice, Cass v. AmeriDebt, Inc., No. 01-CH-20350 (Cook County Cir. Ct. Ill. 
County Dept. Chancery Div. Mar. 23, 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Memorandum of 
Law as Amicus Curiae, Erikson v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99-CH-18873 (Cook County 
Cir. Ct. Ill. County Dept. Chancery Div. June 21, 2002); Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities as Amici Curiae Regarding the Proposed Class Ac-
tion Coupon Settlement and Petition for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Haese v. H&R 
Block, No. CV-96-423 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 4, 2003).
98 See Beisner et al., Class Action Cops, supra note 93, at 1449 (discussing pending 
class action settlements in which the FTC has sought intervenor status or leave to file 
an amicus brief). 
99  Letter from Timothy J. Muris, former Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Peter 
G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States (Feb. 15, 2002) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/ 
02/rule23letter.pdf; see also Mayer, supra note 93, at A17 (indicating that the FTC has 
“urged the Judicial Conference . . . to amend its class action rules in a way that could 
limit attorney fees”). 
100 R. Ted Cruz, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed Trade Comm’n, Friend of the 
Court:  The Federal Trade Commission’s Amicus Program, Remarks before the Anti-
trust Section of the American Bar Association 17 (Dec. 12, 2002), http:// 
www.ftc.gov.speeches/other/tcamicus [hereinafter Cruz Remarks]. 
101 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 201-06 (discussing the overdeterrence 
argument in the context of piggybacking or follow-on class actions). 
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promoting litigation that is not only contrary to the interests of the class, 
but unnecessarily raises the cost of goods and services to consumers gen-
erally.
102
Taken together, the FTC’s efforts to torpedo class action settlements 
and to amend Rule 23 to encourage limitations on attorneys’ fees in 
class suits reveal a strongly politicized version of the compensationalist 
view.103
A cynic might also point to the Justice Department’s six-year 
probe and recent indictment on federal racketeering charges of the 
mega-plaintiffs’ class action firm Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman 
as the apotheosis of this politicized version of solicitude for class 
members.104  Whether or not the government can make out its case 
(and whether or not it is a case worth making out),105 the indictments 
have severely weakened the firm—nearly one-fifth of Milberg’s part-
ners and a significant number of its clients have left since news of the 
indictments broke106—and reduced its ability to file and prosecute 
class actions.107
102 Cruz remarks, supra note 100, at 13. 
103 Mayer, supra note 93, at A17. 
104 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Milberg Weiss Law Firm, Two Senior Part-
ners Indicted in Secret Kickback Scheme Involving Named Plaintiffs in Class-Action 
Lawsuits (May 18, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr2006/ 
061.html.  The indictment alleges that the firm and two named partners engaged in 
actions which defrauded class members, as well as the public.  Id.; see also Paul 
Braverman, Milberg Defenders Challenge the Firm’s Indictment, Left and Right, AM. LAWYER, 
Aug. 2006, at 17 (referencing a full-page advertisement in the New York Times that 
called the Milberg Weiss indictment a “cloak for the Bush administration to tear down 
one of our nation’s most vigorous protectors of public rights” and noting that the firm 
had been a big donor to Democratic campaigns). 
105 While the indictment alleges a number of troubling incidents, it is entirely un-
clear why this matter cannot be handled as a state-law ethical issue, with the possibility 
of disbarment or other licensure-revoking penalties.  In other words, why are they mak-
ing a federal case out of it?  See, e.g., Editorial, Very Rough Justice, WALL ST. J., May 22, 
2006, at A12 (describing the Justice Department’s “blunderbuss tactic of indicting the 
entire law firm” as “overzealous”). 
106 See Anthony Lin, Milberg Appointed Co-Lead Counsel in Backdating Suit, LEGAL IN-
TELLIGENCER, July 27, 2006, at 4 (“One of the nation’s leading securities plaintiffs 
firms, Milberg Weiss’s ability to carry on with client matters has been in question since 
the firm and two of its name partners—David Bershad and Steven Schulman—were 
indicted in May on charges they paid illegal kickbacks to class action plaintiffs.”); Mil-
berg Weiss Denies $11M Kickback Charges, LEGAL WEEK, July 27, 2006,  
http://www.legalweek.com/PrintItem.asp?id=29965 (recounting the firm’s not-guilty 
plea).   
107 See Kate Coscarelli, 2006 Sees Sharp Drop in Class-Action Suits, STAR-LEDGER (New-
ark), July 28, 2006, at 51 (describing a 45% reduction in class action filings in the first 
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Courts, naturally, have also responded to concerns over class 
compensation.108 As one court explained, in affirming a denial of at-
torneys’ fees, “[o]ne of the drawbacks of [class action litigation] is the 
fact that attorneys representing the named class representatives often 
are well compensated, while members of the class, those who actually 
suffered legal injury, sometimes receive very modest or disproportion-
ately small awards.”109  Other circuit court judges have offered the 
popular lament that “[a]ctual monetary compensation rarely reaches 
the class members.  Concurrently, and perhaps coincidentally, such 
settlements are virtually always accompanied by munificent grants of 
or requests for attorneys’ fees for class counsel.”110
Finally, and predictably, the popular media have focused on the 
misalignment of interests and class member compensation.  “Media 
reports of class action cases in which the lawyers received fees totaling 
millions of dollars while the class members received only small 
sums”111 have appeared with increasing frequency.112  Mass market 
half of 2006 and speculating whether the Milberg Weiss indictments are a cause of the 
drop in filings); see also Brooke A. Masters, Investors’ Class-Action Lawsuits Drop Sharply, 
WASH. POST, July 27, 2006, at D2 (describing a 31% drop in securities class action suits 
from 2005 to 2006 and ascribing some of the drop to the fact that Milberg Weiss, “the 
country’s largest class action firm [has] been distracted because the firm is under in-
dictment for fraud”). 
108 See, e.g., Patillo v. Schlesinger, 625 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming a 
denial of class certification because “the principal beneficiaries of the class action 
would be plaintiffs’ attorneys”); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., 981 
F. Supp. 969, 972 (E.D. La. 1997) (rejecting a proposed settlement which would have 
given class members a package of safety materials and class counsel $6 million in fees); 
see also James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative 
Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1985) (examining court decisions that 
seem to prioritize class compensation over the deterrence of fraudulent conduct). 
109 Shults v. Champion Int’l Corp., No 95-5865, 1996 WL 599824, at *2 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 17, 1996). 
110 Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 798 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(Nangle, J., concurring); see also Beisner et al., Class Action Cops, supra note 93, at 1450 
(discussing a Florida class action in which the judge reduced attorneys’ fees because 
“[t]oo often, lawyers use class actions as cash cows that ultimately don’t yield much for 
plaintiffs” (quoting Editorial, Pay the Lawyers in Coupons, Too, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Den-
ver), July 25, 2004, at 7E)). 
111 Sherman, supra note 5, at 226-27, (citing Editorial, Making Justice Work, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 25, 2002, at A14, which objected to settlements where class members “get 
token payments, while the lawyers receive enormous fees”). 
112 See generally HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 49-61 (reviewing general and 
business press accounts of class action litigation and concluding that these reports have 
grown increasingly critical over time). 
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books pillorying class action lawyers are regularly published.113  Not 
surprisingly, then, polls indicate that a large majority of Americans do 
not believe class actions are socially useful.114  For example, a poll 
conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce found that 61% of re-
spondents believe that “consumers and class members benefit the 
least from the class action lawsuit system,” 47% say that plaintiffs’ law-
yers “benefit the most” from these suits, and 74% think that class ac-
tions “drive[] up prices and should be restrained.”115
Other polls reveal that similarly negative perceptions are shared 
by lawyers and judges, many of whom apparently believe that “class ac-
tion plaintiffs’ lawyers are overcompensated for the work that they 
do,” particularly in cases where “class members receive in a settlement 
something perceived to be of little value” while “the lawyers seek and 
obtain what seem to be large sums of cash.”116  Consumer advocates 
and public interest lawyers have been particularly harsh, contending 
that “injured consumers get less compensation than they deserve” 
while their lawyers get rich.117
113 See, e.g., CRIER, supra note 53, at 193 (“In much of this class action litigation, the 
only real beneficiaries are the lawyers.”); PATRICK M. GARRY, A NATION OF ADVERSAR-
IES:  HOW THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION IS RESHAPING AMERICA 12 (1997) (“Class-action 
lawsuits reveal the degree to which lawyers instigate and promote litigation primarily 
for their own benefit.”); JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE MONEY LAWYERS:  THE NO-HOLDS-
BARRED WORLD OF TODAY’S RICHEST AND MOST POWRFUL LAWYERS, at xiii (2006) (ob-
serving that in the class action area, “public disgust has veritably transformed the term 
‘trial lawyer’ into something akin to a barnyard epithet”). 
114 See, e.g., Beisner et al., Class Action Cops, supra note 93, at 1444 (referring to 
polls showing that “Americans do not trust the class action system, do not think that 
consumers benefit from class actions, and believe that lawyers take home all the money 
recovered in such cases”); id. at 1444 n.5 (citing Darryl Haralson & Adrienne Lewis, 
USA Today Snapshots:  Opinions on Class-Action Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2003, at 
1B). 
115 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Poll Shows Americans 
Want Class Action Reform:  Almost Half Believe Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Benefit More than 
Consumers (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/ 
2003/march/03-40.htm. 
116
 Class Counsel Report, supra note 25, at 344.  The authors also note, however, that 
“[l]arge recoveries get public attention, and large recoveries often result in substantial 
attorneys’ fees that also attract attention.  When class actions are dismissed, the public-
ity is often sparse or nonexistent, and the fact that class lawyers are uncompensated is 
often not understood.”  Id. at 6 n.13. 
117 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 50 (citing Bob Van Voris, Plaintiff Bar Divided 
By Settlements:  Tiny Payouts, Big Fees Hit by Public Interest Lawyers, NAT’L. L.J., Feb. 23, 
1998, at A1). 
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In short, with “many ordinary” and not-so-ordinary Americans now 
believing that the class action is a socially harmful “device invented by 
greedy plaintiff attorneys”118 who enrich themselves at the expense of 
class members, it appears that compensationalist hegemony has 
achieved a point of near-total saturation. 
II.  CLASS MEMBER COMPENSATION AS A FALSE IDOL 
The extravagant attention lavished on class member compensa-
tion and agency costs in small-claims class actions over the past twenty 
years has been misguided, for a number of related reasons. 
Before discussing why class member compensation in small-claims 
class actions is irrelevant, though, it is worth pausing to ask if, indeed, 
“lawyers . . . walk away with big baskets full of money while consumers 
get very little,”119 as countless commentators assert. 
The empirical evidence strongly suggests that class actions gener-
ate adequate compensation for claimants.  An analysis of 1120 class 
action filings from 1990 to 2003—the most thorough study of its kind, 
undertaken by Class Action Reports—found that “for every dollar recov-
ered in a common fund class action, 18.4 cents goes to the attorneys 
and for other costs (expert fees, out-of-pocket expenses, etc.) and 81.6 
cents goes to the class members.”120  Surely, as the study’s authors con-
cluded, 81.6 cents on the dollar “should seem to be a pretty good deal 
for class members relative to paying, say, 40% to an individual per-
sonal injury lawyer.”121
Another study of class actions in four federal districts, conducted 
by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), “did not show recurring situa-
tions where [Rule 23](b)(3) actions produced nominal class benefits 
in relation to attorneys’ fees.”122  While the FJC study closely analyzed 
118 Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster:  New Myths and Realities of Class Action 
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 180 (2001). 
119 Todd Zywicki, Professor, George Mason Law School, Comments at the 2005 
FTC Workshop:  Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions (Sept. 13, 2004), in 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1289, 1291 (2005) [hereinafter Zywicki Comments]. 
120 Attorney Fee Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, 24 CLASS ACTION REPS. 167 
(2003); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Action 
Settlements:  An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 27, 27 (2004) (evaluating data 
from two studies of class action fee awards over a nine-year period). 
121 Attorney Fee Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, supra note 120, at 167. 
122 Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts:  
Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 77 (1996) available at http://www.fjc.gov/ 
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf#search=‘optouts%20class%20actions’. 
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cases in which “the settlement produced relatively small payments to 
the class,” including nine cases where the average compensatory 
award per class member was less than $100, the authors concluded 
that there was no evidence that these cases failed to produce mean-
ingful aggregate benefits.123  They also found attorneys’ fees in cases 
with small per-plaintiff recoveries directly correlated with aggregate 
class compensation.124   
But even if we were to ignore the empirical data—even if we were 
hell-bent on making policy decisions based upon anecdotes of high 
fees and low aggregate pay-outs—we would still be barking up the 
wrong tree because, in fact, class member compensation just does not 
matter in the vast majority of small-claims class actions. 
A.  Why Compensation Just Does Not Matter 
The vast majority of consumer class actions are low-value claims in 
which the amount at stake for each plaintiff is small.125  There is a 
dearth of reliable data on the average per-plaintiff value of small-
claims consumer class actions, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
these claims very often concern less than $100 per plaintiff.126  In any 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 14, 160-61. 
125 See Class Counsel Report, supra note 25, at 347 (“[B]ecause the common fund 
class action is designed to pool a number of small claims, many members of the class 
do not know and may not care about the litigation.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 
30 (“In the large-scale, small-claim class action context . . . the claims of the individual 
class members are very small.”). 
126 Two well-cited studies peg average per-plaintiff values at more than $100.  For 
example, Professor Hensler’s RAND study of ten consumer class actions found that 
“alleged individual dollar losses” ranged from $3.00 in an insurance premium double-
rounding case to $4500 in a brokerage products case.  But, as the author is correct to 
note, “averages can be deceptive,” and “it is a matter of judgment whether alleged 
losses to individuals are ‘trivial’ . . . or not so trivial.”  HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 
419-20.  Similarly, an FJC study found the median level of recovery per class member to 
range from $315 to $528 across the four districts studied.  Willging et al., supra note 
122, at 7.  Anecdotally, however, it seems that the average dollar value per class mem-
ber in small-claims class actions is probably far lower than either of these studies indi-
cates.  See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 81 (discussing the “widely reported 
settlement of a 1980s class action lawsuit against Levi Strauss & Co., [in which] an es-
timated 7 million households were eligible to collect a maximum of $2.00 per pair of 
blue jeans purchased”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 30 (providing the example of 
$70 per-plaintiff claims at issue in Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974)); Stephen 
E. Frank, First USA Settles Cardholder Suit Alleging It Switched Interest Rates, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 4, 1997, at B8 (discussing a proposed class action settlement based on allegedly 
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event, we certainly assume that the average per-plaintiff stake in a con-
sumer class action case is sufficiently low that most people would not 
go to much bother to seek compensation.127
And, in fact, most people do not bother.  For one thing, very few 
people exercise their right to commence separate litigation as opt-
outs.  Two separate studies have concluded that the opt-out rate in 
consumer class actions is, on average, less than 1% of the total class 
membership.128  Further, the rate at which opt-outs actually com-
mence separate litigation likely is even lower.  This is all the more sig-
nificant since class members and class counsel effectively subsidize 
opt-outs, who are able to free-ride on the litigation work of class coun-
sel, are relieved of litigating often difficult class certification issues, 
and only have to prove their own damages.129
misleading credit card solicitations in which plaintiff cardholders would receive a 
maximum of $3.85 each). 
127 Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 28 (asserting that “[i]n the large-scale, small-
claim class action . . . . [m]ost plaintiffs are unlikely to place any significant value” on 
notice).  Macey and Miller explain: 
Upon receiving and reading notice of the suit, the typical plaintiff in a large-
scale, small-stakes class action has a choice between two courses of action.  She 
can do nothing, in which case she will receive a check in the mail if the suit is 
successful and will incur no costs if the suit fails.  Or she can go to the trouble 
of opting out of the action, in which case she will receive nothing whether or 
not the suit is successful.  Such a decision is not hard to make.  Nearly every-
one who understands the nature of this choice will elect to do nothing and 
thereby remain part of the class action. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
128 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors 
in Class Action Litigation:  Theoretical and Empirical Issues 4 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=528146 (finding that, “on average, less than one percent of 
class members opt-out and about one percent of class members object to class-wide 
settlements,” with the lowest numbers of opt-outs in consumer class actions); Willging 
et al., supra note 122, at 10, 135 (finding that “the median percentage of members who 
opted out of a settlement was either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total membership of the class; 
75% of the opt-out cases had 1.2% or fewer of class members opt out”; and that nearly 
56% of the class actions studied had not one single opt-out). 
129 See Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 30-31 (assuming that opting out “affords class 
members the opportunity to exit before class trial or settlement of the common ques-
tions without bearing any obligation to pay the full pro rata share of class counsel’s fee 
for prosecuting the class claim on the common questions”); id. at 35 (“Class counsel 
will reduce the collective investment in light of the lower net return resulting from free 
riding opt-outs, thereby undermining optimal deterrence to make everyone worse off 
ex ante.”). 
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But even if opt-out rates were high, the fact is that class mem-
bers—by definition—have elected not to opt out.  The compensation-
alists lavish their concern on the people who have decided that it is 
not worth their time and bother to pursue their claims for compensa-
tion, notwithstanding the subsidized opportunity offered them by the 
opt-out notice.  If the amount at issue was worth chasing, the plaintiff 
could have opted out.130
Of course, it is possible that the plaintiff was not aware of her opt-
out right.131  But that would be the case only if her stake were so low 
that she could not be bothered to read the notice material that in-
formed her of the claim.132  After all, the opt-out notice is generally 
the first notification that the class member receives that a claim even 
exists.  If the class member’s stake is so low that it is not worth her 
time to read the notice, we find that perfectly understandable.133  Less 
130 Hensler notes: 
If the loss is large and apparent to the individual consumer or business, that 
party may seek legal advice and, eventually, bring an individual lawsuit.  But if 
the loss is small, it is less likely to be recognized by those affected, and it is less 
likely that anyone will come forward to claim compensation even if many indi-
viduals or businesses are affected by it.  Most individuals are too preoccupied 
with daily life and too uninformed about the law to pay attention to whether 
they are being overcharged or otherwise inappropriately treated by those with 
whom they do business.  Even if they believe that there is something inappro-
priate about a transaction, individuals are likely just to “lump it,” rather than 
expend the time and energy necessary to remedy a perceived wrong. 
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 68 (citation omitted). 
131 In some scenarios, individuals with high-value claims must opt out (or else be 
kicked out) of the class action because their claims differ from those of the class and 
threaten the commonality required for certification.  See, e.g., Zywicki Comments, supra 
note 119, at 1295 (observing that, where individual class members have high-value 
claims, “chances are [that] interests diverge, usually the [individual] case will differ 
[from the class claims], and maybe people should be getting individual representa-
tion”). 
132 See, e.g., John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1419, 1420 (2003) (“Consumed with matters that impinge on ordinary life, most 
people throw out notice letters without reading them, much less understanding 
them.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 28 (describing the rational response of the 
small-claims consumer upon receiving an opt-out notice for a claim she never even re-
alized she had as “do[ing] nothing”). 
133 Some commentators suggest that the failure of class members to opt out or as-
sert claims upon settlement is due to confusing notices or an overwhelming volume of 
mail, rather than to mere indifference.  See, e.g., Pamela Jones Harbour, Commis-
sioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comments at the 2005 FTC Workshop:  Protecting Con-
sumer Interests in Class Actions (Sept. 13, 2004), in 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 
1290 (2005) (“[I]n the modern day era of mass communications where most consum-
ers face overflowing email or snail mail, we need . . . to craft and . . . distribute class 
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understandable is why we should be concerned with her compensa-
tion. 
We wholeheartedly agree with critics such as Coffee, Redish, 
Macey, and Miller who argue that the overwhelming majority of con-
sumer class actions are lawyer-initiated and lawyer-driven:  the claims 
are developed by lawyers who then present the litigation opportunity 
to individuals or entities with standing to sue.134  This recognition, 
however, supports our argument, not the argument of the compensa-
tionalists:  we, too, would be concerned with compensation if injured 
plaintiffs, seeking monetary redress, banded together and approached 
a plaintiffs’ lawyer to press their claims in a class action.135  But that is 
not how small-claims class actions work, as these scholars remind us. 
Further, our theory that compensation in small-claims class ac-
tions does not matter would be significantly undermined if we be-
lieved that consumers, at the time of contracting, attached any mean-
ingful value to the right to someday seek compensation in a class 
action.136  If they did, rules that diminish or eliminate compensation 
rights would have economic repercussions; they would affect con-
sumer conduct.  But we don’t think consumers would do anything dif-
ferently if their right to receive money in a 23(b)(3) class action were 
eliminated altogether.  We doubt that a single sale would be lost or di-
verted.137  By contrast, if individuals could not sue for damages, they 
notices that won’t inadvertently be thrown out by consumers or deleted as junk mail.”).  
We think, however, that if the amount of damages at issue is sufficiently important to 
the recipient of the notice, she might take the time to open the mail, read the notice, 
and establish her stake in the settlement.
134 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the leading role of attor-
neys in every stage of class action litigation). 
135 Cf. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 403-06 (describing consumer class actions 
in which individuals contacted attorneys seeking representation).  Hensler cites the 
Pinney v. Great Western Bank litigation, which started after “hundreds of Great Western 
brokerage products purchasers” contacted an attorney, who then “invited attorney 
friends with employment law and civil rights experience to join him in a class action” 
against the defendant.  Id. at 404-05. 
136 See Gilles, Opting Out of Liability, supra note 12, at 427 (rejecting the possibility 
that, at the time of contracting, consumers and other putative class plaintiffs place any 
value on the ability to seek damages via the class action device). 
137 On a related note, David Rosenberg explains that, if given a choice, most peo-
ple would 
select a [legal] system that prioritized optimal deterrence over compensating 
loss from otherwise preventable unreasonable risk, or any other litigation-
related interest, such as personal control over the prosecution of claims.  
These conclusions reflect the overwhelming evidence of peoples’ revealed 
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might not contract to buy a house, or visit a particular doctor, or take 
any of a million different actions.138  At work here are two related 
points:  (1) the right to seek compensation ceases to be meaningful 
(viewed ex ante) when the value of the potential claim is low; and (2) 
the right to receive money damages as part of a class is far less likely to 
be meaningful, ex ante, than the right to sue for damages. 
B.  Empirical Support from Securities Fraud Class Action Analysis 
We draw further support here from empirical work done by cer-
tain scholars in the area of securities class actions.  According to a 
study by James Cox and Randall Thomas of 118 securities class action 
settlements, institutional investors in these cases suffered an “average 
mean loss” of almost $850,000, and an “average median loss [of] 
roughly $275,000.”139  With losses of this degree, one might think that 
class members would evince some concern with obtaining compensa-
tion. 
The Cox and Thomas study, however, tells a dramatically different 
story:  on average,  “approximately seventy percent of the institutions 
with provable losses fail to present their claims” in response to no-
tices—often repeated notices—from settlement fund claims adminis-
trators.140  The study also found that institutional investors fail to es-
and expressed preferences and follow logically from the proposition that effi-
cient reduction of accident costs increases the individual’s expected net wel-
fare across all possible states of the world. 
Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 26 (internal citations omitted). 
138 Perhaps unfairly, we will pick on a student note-writer here, who writes that 
“[i]f individuals had no means of redress for their small claims, they would likely lose 
faith in the marketplace . . . .”  Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Law-
suits in a Globalized Economy:  Permitting Foreign Claimants To Be Members of Class Action 
Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1585 (2005).  If the writer 
means that consumers would be disheartened in a general sense if there were no class 
action deterrent, we agree.  If she means that consumer behavior is related to the abil-
ity to recover on small claims, her argument is belied by the evidence. 
139 Cox & Thomas, supra note 83, at 424. 
140 Id. at 450.  Earlier studies revealed similarly low claim rates by large institu-
tional investors.  For example, in analyzing data provided to the Senate Securities Sub-
committee by Gilardi & Co., a leading claims administrator, Weiss and Beckerman 
found that “the fifty largest claimants in eighty-two actions accounted for a median of 
57.8% and an average of 57.5% of all allowed losses, even though they represented 
only a median of 1.7% and an average of 3.5% of all claims filed.”  Weiss & Beckerman, 
supra note 3, at 2089.  They also found that “the fifty largest claimants’ average loss was 
$597,000 in the eighty-two actions for which all necessary data were reported; their 
median loss was $267,927.  In fifteen of those actions, the fifty largest claimants’ aver-
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tablish systems for the submission or monitoring of claims filings.141  
The data suggest that these investors, not unlike their consumer coun-
terparts, simply cannot be bothered to take any affirmative action to 
recover funds from class settlements.142
Professor A.C. Pritchard argues that these results are not surpris-
ing.  Analyzing the Cox and Thomas data, along with other public in-
formation, Pritchard makes a ballpark assessment that the unclaimed 
losses of these institutional investors represent only “0.087% of assets 
under management,” adding that “most people—including the insti-
tutions ignoring class action settlements—would consider 0.087% to 
be in the range of a rounding error.”143  While one might argue that 
assets under management is not a fair measuring stick—that market 
cap or some other gauge of net worth is more appropriate—the point 
remains the same:  the amounts at stake in securities class action set-
tlements are so low that institutional investors do not feel compelled 
to file claims.144  Not surprisingly, Pritchard surmises that “[n]o rea-
sonable investor considering where to allocate his savings . . . would 
take into account the availability of class action settlements.”145
Of course, it is one thing to say that institutional investors are un-
interested in submitting claims forms to recover losses totaling less 
than 0.1% of their assets under management (or, say, 1% of net 
age allowed loss exceeded $1 million.”  Id.; see also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value 
of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1449 (1994) (asserting, 
based on a review of securities class action settlements, that “a substantial number of 
shares—perhaps 40% or more—do not file claims”). 
141 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 83, at 445 (“[The] majority of our survey re-
spondents did very little monitoring of their custodians or advisors to determine if they 
were forwarding settlement notices and, for those contracting out claims filing services, 
filing claims.”). 
142 That institutional investors fail to make claims upon settlement of securities 
class action suits is all the more surprising given that these plaintiffs are “sophisticated 
and well-informed members” of the business world who often compete at the begin-
ning of a class action “for the position of lead plaintiff” or contest “the settlement’s 
fairness or the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees” at the end of the litigation.  Cof-
fee, Securities Class Action, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
143 A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883-84 (2002). 
144 See id. at 884 (“It seems unlikely that such a small percentage would make a dif-
ference in the competition to attract investors.  Perhaps money managers have more 
important things to worry about.  For example, money managers may spend their time 
investigating companies so as to avoid investing in fraudulent firms.”). 
145 Id.  Pritchard’s point lines up nicely with our argument that consumers, at the 
time of contracting, do not attach any meaningful value to the right to someday seek 
compensation in a class action.  See supra text accompanying notes 136-38 (concluding 
that consumers do not value the possibility of future class action damages). 
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worth), and perhaps another to expect similar behavior from individ-
ual consumers.  And yet, the median household net worth in the 
United States in 2000 was valued at $55,000,146 so that the average per-
plaintiff damage value in a typical consumer class action amounts to 
between .1% and .3% of household net worth.147  Given these num-
bers, should we really be surprised if individual consumer class mem-
bers ignore claims forms at an even higher rate than their institutional 
counterparts?148
C.  The Efficiency Myth 
Just as it distorts matters to evaluate class action rules through the 
prism of class member compensation, so too is it unfruitful to use ad-
ministrative efficiency as a guidepost.  Efficiency, in this context, re-
fers to the reduction of the time and expense of adjudicating a multi-
plicity of factually similar suits.149
The fact of the matter is that in small-claims cases, the class action 
device does not promote administrative efficiency at all.  It brings 
cases into the system that would otherwise never have been brought.  
It does not save time or money; it costs time and money.  The com-
mon misconception is that the alternative to the class action is thou-
146 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NET WORTH & ASSET OWNER-
SHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS:  1998 & 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2003pubs/p70-88.pdf. 
147 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the likely per-plaintiff 
values at stake in small-claims class actions). 
148 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers regularly fail to make claims 
for recovery from class funds.  See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 81 (asserting 
that attorneys for both sides “do not know precisely how many [class members] will 
come forward to claim their share of the settlement”).  Hensler notes that in the Levi 
Strauss settlement, “somewhere between 14 and 33 percent of all eligible consumers 
filed claims” seeking compensation from the settlement fund, while “in a 1988 suit 
against Wells Fargo, less than 5 percent of eligible account holders came forward to 
claim refunds”).  Id.  Moreover, in three of the six consumer class actions studied, 
“class members claimed less than half of the funds set aside for compensation,” and 
only about 30% to 35% of these funds were ultimately collected.  Id. at 429. 
149 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (“Subdivision (b)(3) en-
compasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, 
and expense . . . .”); cf. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 49 (“Is the Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action primarily an administrative efficiency mechanism, a means for courts and par-
ties to manage a large number of similar legal claims, without requiring each litigant to 
come forward and have his or her claim considered individually?”). 
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sands of individual claims.150  But in the typical consumer case, the al-
ternative is no case at all.151
In sum, neither class member compensation nor administrative ef-
ficiency is a useful normative polestar for evaluating the rules and 
practices surrounding small-claims class actions.  The interjection of 
these concepts only distracts from the appropriate focus of any such 
examination, which ought to be—singularly—upon the value of de-
terrence. 
III.  EXAMINING CLASS ACTION RULES AND PRACTICES THROUGH THE 
ONE TRUE LENS OF DETERRENCE 
We assert that the primary goal in small-claims class actions is de-
terrence, and that the only question we should ask with respect to any 
rule or reform proposal in this area is whether it promotes or opti-
mizes deterrence.  Once we abandon our obsession with agency costs 
and windfall fees, discard our compensationalist lenses, and pledge 
fealty to the one true value of compelling corporate defendants to in-
ternalize the social costs of their actions, everything takes on a new 
light.  An examination of some of the hot-button issues in the class ac-
tion arena bears this out. 
A.  Reexamining Attorneys’ Fee Rules 
As discussed above, the lodestar cross-check has been almost uni-
versally adopted by courts to ensure “that plaintiffs’ lawyers are not re-
ceiving an excessive fee at their clients’ expense.”152  The dominant 
150 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 49-50 (observing that because class 
actions require “telling people that they may have a claim of which they were previ-
ously unaware . . . virtually every damage class action has the potential to expand the 
pool of litigants beyond what it would have been without class litigation”). 
151 The analysis shifts where the class is made up of individuals with high-value 
claims.  As one commentator has noted: 
The efficiency objective is less applicable to small-claim securities, antitrust, 
and consumer class actions.  In these cases, the losses sustained by individual 
investors and consumers are rarely large enough to justify independent law-
suits . . . . After all, from a pure efficiency standpoint, a class action certainly 
imposes greater burdens upon the court and upon corporate defendants than 
no suit at all. 
Buschkin, supra note 138, at 1584. 
152 Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 
supra text accompanying note 64 (discussing various authors’ concerns with the poten-
tial for “windfall” attorneys’ fees under a percent-of-fund method). 
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sentiment is summed up in the title of District Judge Vaughn Walker’s 
article The Ethical Imperative of a Lodestar Cross-Check:  Judicial Misgivings 
About “Reasonable Percentage” Fees in Common Fund Cases.153 In that arti-
cle, Judge Walker and his coauthor propose that courts “should as a 
matter of course perform a lodestar cross-check” to ensure that 
“common funds will not be depleted by unreasonably high attorney 
fee awards computed using the percentage method.”154  Nonetheless, 
the demonstrable reality is that the vaunted lodestar cross-check en-
sures suboptimal deterrence. 
1.  The Lodestar Cross-Check Caps Deterrent Value 
If we accept the premise that class-action plaintiffs’ lawyers are en-
trepreneurial agents who will act in their own best economic inter-
ests,155 then we have to accept that the lodestar cross-check caps set-
tlements, often at grossly suboptimal levels. 
A hypothetical will illustrate this point.  Suppose that a defendant 
has $1 billion in potential liability (i.e., after a trial), and that the 
plaintiff class has a 75% chance of winning the case, having survived 
various dispositive motions and won its motion to certify the class.  
Suppose further that the plaintiffs’ lawyers know that, at most, they 
can generate a lodestar of $5 million preparing for trial,156 and that 
the highest multiplier this jurisdiction ever awards on a lodestar is 
4x—i.e., four-times-lodestar.157  Now, if the defendants put a settle-
153 Walker & Horwich, supra note 68. 
154 Id. at 1470. 
155 See Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards:  Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 481-82 (1997) (asserting that, in some cases, class counsel “has 
an incentive to settle the case for a miniscule fraction of its value to the class”); see also 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions:  Ethical Dilemmas, Class 
Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 REV. LITIG. 557, 580 (2003) (describing class set-
tlement as the moment “when class counsel may face a tradeoff between counsel fees 
and relief for the class”). 
156 See infra text accompanying notes 169-78 (discussing lodestar generation). 
157 Recall that the lodestar cross-check requires courts to check a percent-of-fund 
award against a lodestar.  The court calculates the lodestar by multiplying hours ex-
pended by a reasonable fee.  It then applies to the lodestar a “multiplier” to account 
for the risk and quality of work by class counsel.  See supra text accompanying note 65.  
The multipliers generally range from 1x to 5x the lodestar amount.  See Attorney Fee 
Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, supra note 120, at 167 (examining 1120 class ac-
tions over a thirteen-year period and finding that multipliers in these cases ranged 
from 1.10 to 4.50); Walker & Horwich, supra note 68, at 1472 (“In our informal review, 
the multipliers ranged from about 1.0 to over 5.0, with a substantial number of multi-
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ment offer on the table for $100 million, what can we expect the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to do? 
Acting as independent entrepreneurs in their own economic self-
interest, the lawyers will settle a $1 billion case (or, on an expected 
value analysis, a $750 million case158) for $100 million.  At 4x-lodestar, 
the maximum attorneys’ fee allowable under a lodestar cross-check is 
$20 million.  If courts award attorneys’ fees of approximately 25% of 
the common fund,159 subject to cross-checking, then the court can be 
expected to award that $20 million fee on any settlement of $80 mil-
lion or more.  So even if the lawyers were to procure a $750 million 
settlement, they would still “only” receive the $20 million fee, as op-
posed to the $187.5 million they could expect in a pure percent-of-
fund regime.  In a lodestar cross-check world, there is simply no in-
centive to expend any additional effort, or take any additional risk, to 
increase the amount of the recovery much over $80 million.160
Because the true settlement value of the case is $750 million, it 
might seem a pretty safe bet that some brinksmanship—for example, 
picking a jury and beginning a trial—would unlock hundreds of mil-
lions of incremental settlement dollars from the defendant.  But our 
rational entrepreneurial lawyer will not take that risk.161  Her incentive 
pliers in the 3.0 to 4.0 range.”); see also Patricia M. Hynes, Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attor-
neys Earn What They Get, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 243, 245 (1999) (referenc-
ing an empirical study by two Harvard economists in the early 1990s that concluded 
that class actions were “economically impractical if the anticipated fee multiplier . . . 
upon successful conclusion of the case was no higher than two, even if the likelihood 
of success in the case was 70%”). 
158 The “true” settlement value of the case, on an expected value model, is $750 
million where there is a 75% chance of winning $1 billion at trial. 
159 See Casey, supra note 40, at 1279 (“‘District courts across the nation . . . appar-
ently eased into a practice of “systematically” awarding fees in the 25% range, “regard-
less of type of case, benefits to the class, numbers of hours billed, size of fund, size of 
plaintiff class, or any other relevant factor.”’”) (quoting Goldberger v. Integrated Res., 
Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2000)); Walker & Horwich, supra note 68, at 1457-58 
(noting that courts typically award fees somewhere between 25% and 30% of the fund 
under the percent-of-fund approach).
160 Of course, this model is based on a maximum pre-trial lodestar, and an addi-
tional lodestar is generated by trying a case.  However, the marginal increase in lode-
star through a trial is rarely a serious consideration, given the extraordinary risk posed 
by virtually any trial.  And again, the lawyers’ huge downside risk is not offset by any 
commensurate prospect of upside returns where the lodestar cross-check is in effect; 
instead, the only offsetting benefit is some marginal increase in lodestar. 
161 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 22 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys may . . . wish 
to settle . . . on the eve of trial, knowing that in so doing they obtain most of the bene-
fits they can expect from the litigation while eliminating their downside risk.”); 
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to settle caps out at around $80 million.  She will want to exceed that 
number somewhat—to build in a cushion of 25% or so162—for a real 
“settlement-incentive breakpoint” of $100 million.  Accordingly, the 
defendant’s offer will serve her interests. 
As this hypothetical shows, the lodestar cross-check may “protect” 
class members against windfall attorneys’ fees, but it seriously under-
mines the value of deterrence, aligning incentives to cap the amount 
of social costs the corporate wrongdoer is forced to internalize.  And it 
does this in every case that warrants our concern.  The only instances 
where the lodestar cross-check does not cap settlement amounts are 
cases where the lodestar method would produce a higher fee than the 
percent-of-fund approach.  But in such cases there is nothing to cross-
check the fee against, and courts will simply apply the percent-of-fund 
approach. 
a.  Why Do Compensationalists Favor Cross-Checks? 
One would think that compensationalists too might embrace this 
critique of the lodestar cross-check.  After all, on the above hypotheti-
cal, a straight percent-of-fund approach would have produced not 
only a greater overall deterrence wallop ($750 million versus $100 mil-
lion), but also a higher net recovery for class members ($562.5 mil-
lion163 as opposed to $80 million).  But they do not embrace it, and we 
think there are several reasons why. 
In cases where the true settlement value of a case is relatively close 
to the lawyers’ “settlement-incentive breakpoint” (where the lawyers 
Manesh, supra note 47, at 935 (“Even though he knows that more time spent in nego-
tiation, and perhaps litigation, could yield a larger recovery for his clients, the class 
counsel may realize that the additional time invested would not be worth the addi-
tional fees—it would reduce his hourly compensation.”).
162 The 25% cushion reflects the fact that neither the average percentage award 
(here, 25%) nor the average lodestar multiplier (here, 4x-lodestar) is likely set in 
stone.  The cushion protects against a lower-than-normal percent award (class counsel 
might as well get the settlement up because the court may award only 20% instead of a 
standard 25%) and positions the lawyer to benefit from a higher multiplier (if the 
court awards 5x-lodestar, and class counsel has based its breakpoint on an assumption 
of 4x-lodestar, she would be leaving money on the table).  See, e.g., Macey & Miller, su-
pra note 2, at 52 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys have little means for predicting how many of 
their hours the judge will allow [under the lodestar approach], other than guesses 
based on the trial judge’s reputation as ‘tough’ or ‘lenient’ on fees.”). 
163 We are assuming settlement at the true value of $750 million and a pure 25 
percent-of-fund attorneys’ fee. 
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will settle out of self-interest),164 the lodestar cross-check will often 
yield a higher class member compensation but lower overall settle-
ment amount than a pure percent-of-fund approach.  For example, if 
the true settlement value in our hypothetical were $105 million, then 
the class member compensation would be higher under a lodestar 
cross-check, even though the overall settlement would be lower.  The 
following tables reflect this calculus (all terms and assumptions are de-
fined in the footnote, and all dollar values are in millions):165
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 Again, the “settlement-incentive breakpoint” is the lowest settlement number 
that will yield the attorney her maximum fee, which is capped by the lodestar cross-
check. 
165 The term “maximum fee” refers to 4x-lodestar; percent-of-fund awards are pre-
sumed to be 25%; and the “settlement-incentive breakpoint” is the lowest settlement 
number that will yield the max fee after factoring in the 25% cushion described above.  
See supra note 162.   
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Table 1:  Lodestar Cross-Check 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
True Value 750 105 
Lodestar 5   5 
Maximum fee 20 20 
Breakpoint 
(with cushion) 
100 100 
Settlement 100 100 
Fees 20 20 
Class members’ 
compensation 
80 80 
 
 
Table 2:  Percent-of-Fund 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
True Value 750 105 
Lodestar n/a n/a 
Maximum fee n/a n/a 
Breakpoint 
(with cushion) 
n/a n/a 
Settlement 750 105 
Fees 187.5     26.25 
Class members’ 
compensation 
562.5      78.75 
 
 
Table 3:  Which System Benefits the Value of… 
 
Value $750M value case $105M value case 
Deterrence? 
Percent-of-fund  
(750 versus 100) 
Percent-of-fund  
(105 versus 100) 
Class 
Compensation? 
Percent-of-fund 
(562.5 versus 80) 
Lodestar cross-check 
(80 versus 78.75) 
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So, the compensationalists’ enthusiasm for cross-checking might 
reside in empirical intuitions about whether true settlement values 
tend to lie close to the settlement-incentive breakpoints of entrepre-
neurial class lawyers, or the frequency with which class compensation 
will indeed be enhanced in a cross-checking regime.  Or perhaps the 
reason is rooted in an aversion to windfall profits for plaintiffs’ law-
yers.  That aversion could be either moral or instrumental.  One 
might argue that allowing plaintiffs’ lawyers to make too much money 
will lead to too many class filings, or drive too many lawyers into the 
class action business.  But none of that, in truth, matters if we adopt 
the value of deterrence as our normative polestar. 
b.  Deterrence Abhors a Cross-Check 
Once we have accepted that the only pertinent value is forcing de-
fendants to internalize the social costs of their actions, there is only 
one line item that matters:  aggregate settlements.  Nothing else mat-
ters—not “windfalls,” not class compensation, and certainly not ratios 
of attorney fees to lodestars or settlement values. 
Any disunity between “true” settlement values and actual settle-
ments represents a simple deficit (or surplus) of deterrence.  The dif-
ferential between lawyers’ settlement-incentive breakpoints and true 
settlement values represents a gulf of inefficiency. 
It is worth considering whether empirical testing might bear out 
the hypothesis that a pure percent-of-fund regime will yield higher set-
tlements, over time and across like cases, than a lodestar cross-check 
regime.166  We are somewhat skeptical, however, that credible data can 
be obtained.  Even if there was a sufficiently large data set controlling 
for all of the many variables at play, the results would not be meaning-
ful unless we were assured that the lawyers knew in advance that the 
court would award fees on a pure percent-of-fund basis, without re-
gard to lodestar.  The lodestar works its dark magic not on a case-by-
case basis, but rather jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction.  If a court sometimes 
166 The closest we have seen to an analysis of this sort was conducted by the au-
thors of Attorney Fee Awards in Common Fund Class Actions, supra note 120, at 167, finding 
that in cases using the percent-of-fund approach, attorneys received approximately 
21% of the fund, while in cases using the lodestar or lodestar cross-check approach 
they received approximately 14.5% of the fund.  Needless to say, such data do not il-
luminate the question of whether—everything else being equal—a pure percent-of-
fund regime will produce higher settlements. 
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employs a lodestar cross-check, then self-interested entrepreneurial 
lawyers will conduct their affairs accordingly.167
2.  Under the Current, Perverse Regime, Unethical Bill-Padding 
Actually Benefits Class Members 
Another value trumpeted in the traditional compensational-
ist/agency-cost/anti-windfall critique is the avoidance of high agency 
costs in the form of padded bills, “churned” hours, overstaffed cases, 
and generally wasteful attorney practices.168  Here again, the tradi-
tional view is off-base. 
The perverse and subversive reality is that, under the current re-
gime, all of this bill-padding, document-churning and so forth are 
good things, both for class member compensation and deterrent val-
ues.  Here is why:  Suppose that the lawyers in our previous hypotheti-
cal (the one with the $750 million settlement value) were able, 
through otherwise unproductive activity, to increase their lodestar 
from $5 million to $8 million.  The settlement math then plays out 
differently.  The lawyers understand that, at 4x-lodestar, their maxi-
mum fee is probably $32 million, no matter how large the fund they 
create.  They also understand that under the percent-of-fund method, 
the court would likely award no more than 25% of the common fund 
as a fee.  Thus, the initial breakpoint at which the lawyers will settle is 
$128 million; adding the 25% cushion, as before, results in a “settle-
ment-incentive breakpoint” of $160 million.  While the lawyers have 
no incentive to push beyond $160 million, they have increased the 
overall fund (and the overall punishment visited upon the defendant) 
by $60 million, as reflected in the table: 
 
 
 
167 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 53 (noting that, in determining the 
expected outcome, “[a]t issue . . . is not what the trial court believed, but what the 
plaintiffs’ attorney reasonably believed”). 
168 See, e.g., BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL:  
REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION 35 (1989) (“[T]here is a consensus 
that some litigation costs are not demanded by the merits of the case, but rather are 
incurred as a direct outgrowth of the incentives that have been built into the private 
legal industry itself.”); Steven A. Burns, Note, Setting Class Action Attorneys’ Fees:  Reform 
Efforts Raise Ethical Concerns, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 1166 (1993) (observing that 
class action lawyers may be tempted to “overclaim hours worked and pad their bills”).
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Table 4:  Effects of Ethical vs. Unethical Attorney Behavior 
 
 Ethical 
(no “churning”) 
Unethical  
(with “churning”) 
True Value 750 750 
Lodestar 5 8 
Max fee 20 32 
Breakpoint  
(with cushion) 
100 160 
Settlement 100 160 
Fees 20 32 
Class members’ 
compensation 
80 128 
  
 Note, too, that the lawyers have increased class members’ com-
pensation by $48 million, and that they did it all by ginning up $3 mil-
lion in additional billable hours.  Or, to put it conversely:  if the law-
yers act as rational-but-ethical economic actors (as we expect they 
will), they will cost their clients $48 million. 
So not only has the misguided obsession with attorney compensa-
tion and agency costs begotten a system that always retards the deter-
rent power of class actions and usually fails to promote the value of 
class compensation, but, in addition, this obsession with protecting 
class members from supposedly avaricious class counsel has also, irony 
of ironies, aligned class member interests with the very unethical be-
havior that inspires the compensationalist critique. 
Nonetheless, in the face of these perverse constructs, over time 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have developed business structures to serve the in-
terests of funding and effectively prosecuting complex class actions 
within ethical bounds.  And here again, as discussed below, one’s view 
of these structures is likely to vary according to whether one has ac-
cepted deterrence of corporate wrongdoing as the animating project 
of small-claims class actions. 
B.  Examining the Organizational Model of Class Action Lawyering 
The class action bar is a highly evolved organism.  Over time, it 
has developed structures to achieve three key objectives:  (1) effec-
tively prosecute the action, (2) generate sufficient lodestar to warrant 
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a return that offsets the risks, and (3) fund the litigation.  From the 
perspective of deterrence, these complex structures are remarkably 
efficient, enabling ad hoc consortia of entrepreneurial lawyers to 
tackle massive litigation projects.169  We suspect, however, that these 
same structures appear grotesque when viewed from the traditional 
agency costs perspective. 
The dominant class action model is a pyramid-shaped structure 
comprised of numerous small law firms.  Two or more co-lead counsel 
typically sit at the top of the pyramid.170  The co-lead counsel are em-
powered to make all decisions relating to the litigation, and to submit 
a unified fee application at the close of the case.  Beneath them on 
the pyramid are lawyers tasked with responsibility for important areas 
169 The capacity for massive lodestar generation is readily apparent in the context 
of a large, well-financed law firm, which can flip a switch and produce prodigious swells 
of associate billings, spending its own cash as it awaits a payout somewhere down the 
line.  See, e.g., Halfteck, supra note 9, at 55 n.181 (noting that law firm-specific attrib-
utes include “the opportunity to exploit firm-wide economies of scale and scope; the 
relative efficiency of a firm’s investment in law enforcement; and the firm’s position on 
an industry-wide learning curve”).  That capacity is less apparent in the context of 
small plaintiffs’ firms.  Over twenty years ago, Professor Coffee asserted:   
[P]laintiffs’ [class action] attorneys are chronically underfinanced.  Given the 
small size of the typical plaintiffs’ firm, its cash flow predictably will be more 
volatile than that of a larger, more diversified firm, and it will probably have 
smaller capital reserves. . . . 
 At the same time, the cost of undertaking a complex action has grown sig-
nificantly in recent years to the point where it can strain or exceed the bor-
rowing capacity of most plaintiffs’ firms.
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion:  The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Liti-
gation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 57 (footnote omitted). 
 Less obvious, however, are the workings of ad hoc groups of small law firms, which 
remain the dominant model for the prosecution of consumer, antitrust, and most 
other class actions outside of the securities area.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, One Stop 
Law Shop, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 34, 37 (“Many large class-actions involving 
antitrust and consumer-fraud issues . . . are handled by ad hoc alliances among multi-
ple firms that split their labor and share the rewards of litigation.”). 
170 The number of co-lead counsel varies, depending on the size of the case, the 
potential liabilities of the defendant(s), and the likelihood and amount of recovery or 
fee award.  See generally Fisch, supra note 25, at 53, 78-80 (describing developments lead-
ing to the appointment of multiple lead counsel in complex litigation).  When ap-
pointing multiple lead counsel, courts tend to consider whether such appointment will 
lead to redundancy or otherwise inappropriately boost the ultimate fee award.  See, e.g., 
In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing the lead 
plaintiff to select two firms as lead counsel, “provided that there is no duplication of 
attorneys’ services, and the use of co-lead counsel does not in any way increase attor-
neys’ fees and expenses”). 
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of the case and, in the lower strata, attorneys whose duties include the 
yeoman’s work of document review and so forth.171
Strikingly, the co-leads are empowered to determine what multi-
plier to apply to firms or attorneys at each level of the pyramid.172  
Each firm submits its lodestar—that is, a record of the hours and 
hourly rates of its participating lawyers—to co-lead counsel.  The co-
leads then collate the hours, writing off duplicative, unauthorized, or 
otherwise noncompensable time, and submit a unitary fee application 
to the court.  Once the award is made, the co-leads, in their sole dis-
cretion, determine the distribution.  If a court awards a multiplier of, 
for example, 4x-lodestar, the co-leads might assign a multiplier of 1.0 
to the bottom level of participating lawyers, 1.5 to the middle, 2.5 to 
“middle managers,” and so forth.  More senior lawyers, who were re-
sponsible for brief writing, key depositions, and the like, might receive 
multipliers as high as 3.0 or the full “case multiplier” (here, 4.0) if it 
was negotiated beforehand.  The differential between the case multi-
plier and the multiplier received by any particular firm represents 
“profit,” which is divided among the co-lead counsel. 
Most interesting, for present purposes, are the peculiar economics 
of the pyramid’s bottom levels.  Courts award attorneys’ fees “com-
mensurate with the rates prevailing in the community” for similar ser-
vices.173  In big cities, where major class actions tend to be litigated, 
171 In most large cases, counsel form committees and receive titles such as “Chair 
of Discovery” or “Executive Committee Member.”  These striations serve multiple ad-
ministrative and operational purposes, allowing the ad hoc structure to operate more 
like a unitary firm.  See, e.g., Nager v. Websecure, Inc. [1998 Transfer Binder Supp.] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,153 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1997) (approving the selection of 
three firms to serve as an “executive committee” to manage the litigation in order to 
“minimize the potential for disputes about the direction of the litigation”). 
172 This power is often set forth in an order of the court appointing co-lead coun-
sel and enumerating their responsibilities.  Even where the authority to divide up fees 
is not expressed in this fashion, industry custom and a complex social system of mutual 
investment dictate that lawyers lower in the hierarchy accord co-lead counsel substan-
tial discretion in the assignment of multipliers.  Where disputes do arise, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that court-appointed mediators, special masters, and magistrates are 
likewise deferential to lead counsel’s determinations on these matters.  See, e.g., In re 
Xcel Energy, Inc., Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000 (D. Minn. 
2005) (awarding attorneys’ fees “to be distributed . . . in a manner that plaintiffs’ co-
lead counsel shall determine in their discretion”); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 209, 225 (D.D.C. 2005) (upholding, for the most part, lead counsel determi-
nations on how to divide $123 million in attorneys’ fees among various law firms). 
173 Yurman Designs, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (cita-
tion omitted). 
GILLES PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006  6:45:01 PM 
150 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 103 
 
 
the prevailing rates for junior associates—who perform most docu-
ment review work—are $200 or more per hour.174  In many markets 
off the beaten path, freelancing lawyers are widely available to staff 
document reviews at, say, $35 per hour.  An enterprising lead counsel, 
then, might tap an experienced yet inexpensive labor pool by estab-
lishing a document review operation in some far-flung locale.175
The spread between the $35-per-hour rate and the potential 
premultiplier recovery of up to $250 per hour allows the consortium 
of small firms to access the capital and labor pool required to take on 
large, well-funded defense firms.  Typically, the co-lead counsel will 
approach other firms and propose that they “sponsor” a reviewer, pay-
ing her (in this example) $35 per hour for up to 1000 hours over the 
course of the project.  The sponsoring firm may never actually meet 
this reviewer; the relationship is purely a financial investment.  The 
sponsoring firm then pays the reviewer $35,000 over the course of the 
review.  At the end of the case, the sponsoring firm submits time re-
cords reflecting 1000 hours of work by the reviewer, and seeking 
compensation at a rate of $250 per hour, for a (premultiplier) lode-
star of $250,000. 
If the court awards a case multiplier of 3x-lodestar, each hour of 
the reviewer’s work is paid out at $750.  Typically, most or all of the 
“profits”—that is, the difference between $250 and $750—will go up-
stream to be split among the co-lead counsel.  The net result, if the 
case is successful, is that the sponsoring firm receives $250,000 for its 
$35,000 investment.176  If the sponsoring firm is adept at evaluating 
the prospects of the underlying cases, the class action model presents 
extraordinary investment opportunities at the bottom of the pyramid.  
174 See, e.g., More Data To Add to Your Review of Billing Rates, LAW OFFICE MGM’T & 
ADMIN. REP., Jan. 2004, at 1, 13-14 (finding that hourly rates for “associates in major 
metropolitan areas (New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington) . . . range 
from $202 to $243 per hour for first-years to a high of $256 to $358 per hour for the 
class of 1996”); Jerry Crimmins, Survey:  Partners Here Bill 1600 Hours Per Year, CHI. 
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 1, 2006, at 1 (“New York associates from the class of 2005 charge 
an average rate of $230 per hour.”). 
175 See, e.g., Halfteck, supra note 9, at 37 n.112 (noting that “large-scale class action 
law enforcement often draws upon not only the representing plaintiffs’ law firms 
themselves but, increasingly, satellite professional-services firms who offer litigation 
consulting and various information-management services”). 
176 This assumes that the co-leads submit the full 1000 hours at the requested rate, 
and that the court awards at least the lodestar claimed in the fee application. 
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If the chance of winning each case well exceeds 10%, then ten-to-one 
odds will pay off handsomely over time.177
This structure plainly serves the objectives of the ad hoc consor-
tium:  it allows the consortium to finance and effectively prosecute the 
class action, bringing to bear resources that rival those of the mam-
moth corporate law firms that are retained to defend significant class 
action litigations.  In this way, the class action structure well serves the 
interests of deterrence.  Viewed from the traditional compensational-
ist/agency-cost-obsessed/antiwindfall perch, this model may appear 
something of a nightmare—a naked lodestar factory.178  From the 
more reasoned deterrence perspective, however, this model repre-
sents a socially useful adaptation to a grossly inefficient set of rules. 
C.  Reexamining Coupon Settlements and CAFA 
By now, it should be fairly clear that rejecting the compensational-
ist viewpoint sheds a different light on the rules and practices involved 
with class actions.  Another example of a class action practice illumi-
nated by a shift from the compensationalist view is coupon-based set-
tlements.179  In enacting provisions of CAFA that deal with coupon set-
tlements, Congress’s intent was explicit:  “Class members often receive 
little or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, 
such as where . . . counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class 
177 See generally Halfteck, supra note 9, at 19-20 (“From the investment perspective 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys, the reality of modern mass society comprises a pool of invest-
ment opportunities, where they may invest financial wherewithal and intellectual capi-
tal to discover and prosecute potential wrongdoing.”). 
178 Professor Resnik notes: 
Despite a legal and popular press filled with stories about large sums paid, col-
lusion, the possibility of kickbacks or payoffs, and entrepreneurial excesses, 
judges—in general—do little to superintend how lawyers divide money among 
themselves, which lawyers are paid for what services, or what “side settlements” 
(made either between lawyers or between defendants and subsets of litigants) 
are permissible. 
Resnik, supra note 13, at 2122 (footnotes omitted). 
179 “In coupon settlements, instead of a cash award, plaintiffs receive coupons or 
other promises for products or services.”  Hantler & Norton, supra note 52, at 1344.  
For a general and critical discussion of pre-CAFA coupon-based settlements, see Leslie, 
supra note 47, at 994 (asserting that defendants may structure settlement coupons in 
ways that make the settlement worthless for many (and sometimes most) class mem-
bers). 
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members with coupons or other awards of little or no value.”180  In re-
sponse, CAFA requires courts to carefully scrutinize these settlement 
deals, but it stops short of telling judges precisely what standards to 
employ in doing so.181
Nevertheless, Congress’s starkly compensationalist framing of the 
issue certainly tracks the orthodox literature, which would disallow 
any coupon-based settlement that does not provide a meaningful net 
financial benefit to the class member.182  The test, in this view, is 
whether the coupons distributed are valuable to the class member re-
cipients.  A deterrence-centric perspective is different.  We care only 
that the coupon issuance will inflict pain on the wrongdoer. 
A court scrutinizing a settlement may well find that value to the 
consumer and detriment to the issuer are two very different things.  
The face value of a coupon to the consumer may be low, and yet a 
court might find, based on evidence presented at a fairness hearing, 
that the redemption rates likely will be sufficiently high to inflict a 
meaningful aggregate detriment upon the defendant issuer.183  This 
might be the case where, for example, the good or service covered by 
the coupon is one that class members would purchase on a regular 
basis,184 and coupon issuance will not “actually lead to additional prof-
its for a defendant.”185  A court might also be influenced by the possi-
bility that a third-party aggregator might swoop in and purchase all of 
the coupons from the claims administrator,186 producing a pot of 
180 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4 
(2005). 
181 Id. § 3(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e) (West 2005)) (requiring that a 
coupon-based settlement be approved only if the court conducts a fairness hearing and 
makes written findings that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate for class 
members”). 
182 See, e.g., Hantler & Norton, supra note 52, at 1346 (asserting that “injured class 
members often do not receive real compensation” in coupon-based settlements). 
183 From the entrepreneurial lawyer’s perspective, it is important to show that re-
demption rates will be high, as CAFA requires that only the value of coupons actually 
redeemed be considered where coupons are the basis for awarding attorneys’ fees.  28 
U.S.C.A. § 1712(a) (West 2005).   
184 See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 303 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (approving a settlement involving $35 vouchers for oil changes where “[a]ll ve-
hicles need an oil change eventually and all vehicle owners anticipate oil changes.”). 
185 Judge D. Brock Hornby, Outline, Fed. Trade Comm’n Workshop Panel:  The 
Use of “Coupon” Compensation and Other Non-Pecuniary Redress 2 (Sept. 13, 2004), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/classaction/writ_materials/hornby.pdf. 
186 See James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443, 1443, 1449 (describing the work of a company that buys 
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money that can be distributed either to plaintiffs or to a charity by way 
of a cy pres distribution.187  As long as the transaction causes the defen-
dant to internalize the social costs of its wrongdoing to some mean-
ingful degree, a properly oriented court ought to approve the settle-
ment.188
Similarly, courts guided by the polestar of forced internalization 
of social costs will not hesitate to approve cy pres settlement distribu-
tions or fluid class recoveries,189 and will award attorneys’ fees in the cy 
pres context on a percent-of-fund basis, just as they would if the settle-
ment funds were distributable to class members.  By contrast, the 
compensationalist approach, as enshrined in CAFA, expressly prohib-
its attorneys’ fees to be calculated on the basis of any portion of cy pres 
relief awarded in a coupon-based class settlement.190  This restriction 
“departs significantly from established practice,” as cy pres relief “usu-
coupons from class members and resells them on the secondary market, and arguing 
that a strong “market maker” is necessary for coupon settlements to benefit consum-
ers). 
187 Compensationalists have been critical of efforts to rehabilitate the value of 
coupons on the secondary markets.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Need To Study 
Coupon Settlements in Class Action Litigation, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1404 (2005) 
(“Transfer restrictions can prevent market makers from making settlement coupons 
truly valuable.”); Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 186, at 1447 (“Rules of redemption 
and enforcement are rarely sufficient to seamlessly redeem a coupon, and few coupons 
are saleable at any price.  Most coupons are burdensome, restrictive and confusing. . . . 
The defendant’s legal department controls the process, preferring to quell redemp-
tions rather than promote redemptions.”). 
 We are more optimistic, and believe that as long as coupons (1) are freely trans-
ferable, (2) may be transferred multiple times without losing value, (3) contain no re-
strictions on aggregation, and (4) do not expire quickly (all of which a judge can easily 
mandate upon approving a coupon-based settlement), secondary markets will neces-
sarily develop at competitive face-value rates. 
188 As an aside, anecdotal evidence suggests that a very small percentage of settling 
class actions provide coupon-only benefits.  See Lisa Mezzetti, Partner, Cohen Milstein, 
Comments at the FTC Workshop:  Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions 
(Sept. 13, 2004) in 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 1178 (2005) (questioning the “em-
phasis on coupon settlements,” given the “very small percentage” of coupon-only set-
tlements). 
189 See, e.g., Michael Northrup, Restrictions on Class-Action Attorney-Fee Awards, 46 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 953, 964 (2005) (describing the cy pres or fluid recovery doctrine, which 
comes from trust law, as authorizing courts “to put unclaimed or undistributed class-
action recoveries to the next best use”) (emphasis omitted). 
190 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e) (West 2005) (providing that the “distribution and re-
demption of any proceeds” from coupon settlements “shall not be used to calculate 
attorneys’ fees”). 
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ally has been considered in awarding attorneys’ fees.”191  But more 
importantly for our thesis, discouraging plaintiffs’ counsel from struc-
turing coupon-based settlements that include cy pres relief has negative 
consequences for the deterrent values of such settlements. 
D.  Reexamining Collective Action Waivers 
We offer one last example of how the rejection of compensation-
alist norms compels different analyses of class action issues; this one is 
drawn from our previous work examining collective action waivers—
clauses contained in standard-form adhesion contracts mandating 
one-on-one arbitration of disputes and waiving the right to seek class-
wide relief.192  Traditional critics of collective action waivers argue that 
when consumers enter into adhesion contracts, they do not assent in 
any meaningful way to the waivers; the fundamental critique is that a 
voluntary and knowing waiver of the individual’s rights is lacking.193  
The corporate defenders of the waivers, meanwhile, argue that busi-
ness efficiency principles compel us to recognize or infer assent from 
contemporary transactions.194  We must find assent in shrinkwrap and 
191 Charles B. Casper, The Class Action Fairness Act’s Impact on Settlements, ANTI-
TRUST, Fall 2005, at 26, 28. 
192 See generally Gilles, Opting Out of Liability, supra note 12, at 391-412 (examining 
the use of contractual class action waivers). 
193 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial 
Institutions:  A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 
342 (1995) (concluding that arbitration mandated by financial institutions may de-
prive consumers of the protections of the justice system); Linda J. Demaine & Deborah 
R. Hensler, “Volunteering” To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average 
Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2004, at 55, 56 (criticiz-
ing court decisions finding that individuals “may now be forced to arbitrate if the par-
ties are deemed to have assented to a predispute arbitration clause”); Mara Kent, 
“Forced” vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23 LAW & INEQ. 95, 115 (2005) 
(arguing, in the context of forced arbitration of employees’ civil rights claims as a con-
dition of employment, that “[o]ur civil rights statutes would be significantly under-
mined if the courts allowed employers to force employees to choose between their 
statutorily protected civil rights and their jobs”); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Bind-
ing Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 6 (2000) (“[I]t would be wrong to allow companies to use arbitration clauses to insu-
late themselves entirely from class action liability . . . .”). 
194 For example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997), 
the court held that a purchaser of a computer was bound to the terms and conditions 
found inside the box, including an arbitration clause, unless he returned the computer 
within a thirty-day period.  Judge Easterbrook’s decision “encapsulate[d] the move 
from a consent-based to an efficiency-based theory of contract law . . . . The only value 
here is efficiency; consent is irrelevant.”  Gilles, Opting Out of Liability, supra note 12, at 
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scroll-text licenses, box-stuffer notices, and so forth, lest the wheels of 
contemporary commerce stop spinning.195
The normative polestar of deterrence tells us that both arguments 
are off course.  Waivers of collective action rights undercut deterrent 
values.  It does not matter whether knowing and voluntary waivers are 
obtained; the class action is not the individual consumer’s procedure 
to waive.196  The goal of forcing defendants to internalize the social 
costs of their actions requires that the class action remain a viable in-
strument in any given case.  Collective action waivers, then, are exer-
cises in pure social disutility. 
IV.  FINALLY ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS:   
THE PROBLEMS OF SUBOPTIMAL DETERRENCE 
Our thesis is not that current class action practices and rules op-
timally deter.  It is that they should.  The goal of improving the deter-
rent function of class suits provides the singular lens through which 
we should examine these practices.  In particular, we should be sensi-
tive to the concerns of whether current class action practices over- or 
underdeter. 
A.  The Overdeterrence Problem 
If we measure class action rules and proposals by whether they in-
crease deterrent value, do we not run the risk of overdeterring effi-
414-15 (footnotes omitted); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency 
Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 682 (noting that cases upholding such unilateral con-
tracts “appear motivated by the utility and practicality of easy forms of contracting”). 
195 Gilles, Opting Out of Liability, supra note 12, at 415 (“Judge Easterbrook postu-
lates that the price of establishing meaningful consent—in the explicit, meeting-of-the-
minds sense of the word—would be to grind contemporary commerce to a halt.”). 
196 If we believe the argument that “consumers—given the choice—may opt to 
waive their right to collective action if that meant cheaper goods and services,” “then 
why not allow companies to require consumers . . . to waive all prospective liability . . . 
in exchange for a reduction on price, or a bump up in wages?”  Id. at 429.  “[C]urrent 
legal doctrine doesn’t allow it:  as a matter of public policy, we prohibit prospective 
waivers of federal statutory liability.”  Id.  In many ways, our view that the waiver of col-
lective litigation rights by individual consumers is irrelevant mirrors our argument that 
compensation to individual class members in small-claims class actions is irrelevant.  In 
both scenarios, the rhetorical and political use of the individual litigant as having 
“rights” is manipulated by the very institutions—big business, defense firms, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, etc.—who wish to see the incidence of liability for violations 
of those “rights” reduced. 
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cient behavior?  After all, to deter optimally is not to deter maximally.  
Our conclusion is that we need not worry too much about this.  Where 
class actions survive dispositive motions,197 they settle.198  And when 
parties settle, they settle for less—significantly less—than the full value 
of the social loss created by the defendant’s actions.199  Indeed, the 
only time a defendant is forced to internalize costs that exceed the so-
cial costs of its actions is, we suspect, when a case goes to judgment,200 
and punitive or treble damages are imposed.  While one can argue 
whether or not punitive damages have social utility, the class action 
arena is an odd place to have that particular debate, given that nearly 
all class actions that survive dispositive motions settle. 
Some scholars—notably John Coffee—have argued that class ac-
tions probably do extract more than the requisite pound of flesh in 
the case of “piggyback” or “follow-on” class actions.  In these suits, 
plaintiffs’ class action lawyers “simply piggyback[] on the [enforce-
ment] efforts of public agencies—such as the SEC, the FTC, and the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)—in order to 
197 See Silver, supra note 74, at 1399 (concluding, based on a review of data on 
summary judgment motions in class action litigation, that “many” class actions “end in 
dismissals, not settlements”). 
198 See Casper, supra note 191, at 26 (discussing a study of individual and class ac-
tion antitrust cases finding that 71% to 88% of those cases settled before trial, and 
three studies finding that between 80% and 90% of securities class actions settled); 
Willging et al., supra note 122, at 66, 115 fig.7, 167 tbl.16 (finding that 53% to 64% of 
class actions studied settled, only 3% to 6% went to trial, and, of those that went to 
trial, 28% settled during or after trial). 
199 It is possible that some defendants settle to avoid the costs of the class action 
procedure, even though the claims would surely—or almost surely—fail on the merits.  
See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 1402 (“Risk averse parties will pay a pre-
mium to avoid taking a gamble.”); Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Litiga-
tion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 587, 600 (2005) (noting that in a “low-merit suit” the defen-
dant’s risk aversion will be heightened, and a “risk-averse defendant would likely pay a 
high premium to avoid the variance of a class action trial”).  It is also possible that a 
defendant may have struggled earnestly to conform to vague consumer protection or 
other laws, only to fall short in circumstances that impose little cost on society.  Impos-
ing liability in these circumstances may result in overdeterrence as others, faced with 
still-ambiguous law, refrain from socially useful activities.  We thank Professor Edward 
Cooper for pointing these issues out to us.  If we are to trust, however, that courts can 
do a fairly good job at vetting frivolous and nonmeritorious cases through motion 
practice—as evidenced by Professor Silver’s conclusion that most class actions end in 
dismissals, see supra note 74 and text accompanying note 197—these concerns should 
not be overstated. 
200 Cf. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 34, at 225 (concluding 
that “the deterrent threat of the private attorney general has been blunted” because so 
few private litigations reach the judgment stage). 
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reap the gains from the investigative work undertaken by these agen-
cies.”201  The result of these follow-on class actions, according to Cof-
fee, is not a broader “scope of law enforcement” or better deterrence, 
but only an intensified penalty.202
The real question here, it seems to us, is whether the penalties in-
flicted in a follow-on private class action, after government agents 
have already imposed some sanction, cause the corporate wrongdoer 
to internalize more than 100% of the social costs of its actions.  We 
are skeptical of that assumption.  In seeking corrective action and levy-
ing fines, government enforcement agencies act with knowledge of 
the claims of class action plaintiffs.203  The SEC, FTC, and DOJ all 
201 Id. at 222.  Coffee describes the “spectacle . . . in which the filing of the public 
agency’s action serves as the starting gun for a race between private attorneys, all seek-
ing to claim the prize of lucrative class action settlements, which public law enforce-
ment has gratuitously presented them.”  Id. at 228; see also Coffee, Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7, at 681 (describing class actions sparked by government 
investigations); Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General:  Perspec-
tives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 376 (1988) 
(describing evidence supporting the claim that “private attorneys tended to ‘piggy-
back’ their cases on governmental investigations, even to the extent of copying the 
government’s complaint”); John E. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas:  An Empirical Study, 14 HOUS. 
L. REV. 769, 824 (1977) (estimating that “about half of the representative securities 
litigation is related to a prior SEC or bankruptcy proceeding”).  In a recent essay, Pro-
fessor Coffee acknowledges that in the area of securities regulation, private class ac-
tions “represent the principal means by which financial penalties are imposed” on de-
fendants, “overshadowing the aggregate penalties imposed by federal and state 
authorities and by self-regulatory organizations.”  Coffee, Securities Class Action, supra 
note 1, at 4. 
202 Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 34, at 223.  While Coffee 
recognizes that an increased penalty may serve some laudatory functions, he remains 
pessimistic that deterrence is optimized in this way.  See id. at 225-26 (discussing two 
problems with follow-on class actions:  private enforcement does not yield actions that 
would not have been instigated by public efforts alone, and private watchdogs often 
accept inadequate settlements in return for higher-than-ordinary fee awards).  Other, 
more partisan observers believe that the increased penalty may actually be harmful.  See 
Beisner et al., Class Action Cops, supra note 93, at 1455 (arguing that class action lawyers 
filing follow-on class actions increase the penalty beyond “the limits established by law” 
and usurp the role “traditionally entrusted to expert regulatory agencies and state at-
torneys general”). 
203 Enforcement agencies explicitly rely on private enforcement actions to sup-
plement their efforts.  See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 69 (quoting former 
SEC chair Arthur Levitt’s testimony before the 1995 U.S. House subcommittee consid-
ering class action reform:  “Private actions . . . provide a necessary supplement to the 
commission’s own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities law violations”); 
Cruz Remarks, supra note 100, at 15 (observing that “piggyback” private class actions 
“can provide an efficient mechanism for directing compensation to injured consum-
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know that the real financial wallop, in most instances, will come from 
the private class actions that follow their investigations.204  In imposing 
penalties, it would be irresponsible for government actors to ignore 
these facts; indeed, strong evidence supports our assertion that they 
do not.205  In the end, we suspect that most piggyback class actions—
like all other class actions—settle for a modest percentage of the over-
all loss imposed, even factoring in government penalties.206
Another common overdeterrence concern lies in “[n]on-
meritorious class actions filed by lawyers who expect defendants to be 
willing to pay something simply to ensure that the class counsel will 
‘go away,’ . . . [thus] dilut[ing] the deterrent effect of class action liti-
gation.”207  Here again, our sense is that this argument is somewhat 
overblown.  Class action practice in the real world is characterized by a 
very high incidence of successful motions to dismiss, successful mo-
ers, particularly where the underlying Commission action seeks only injunctive relief”); 
FTC Press Release, supra note 94 (quoting ex-FTC chairman Thomas B. Leary as hav-
ing noted that “[t]he Federal Trade Commission is a relatively small agency with broad 
competition and consumer protection responsibilities. . . . We depend on private liti-
gation to supplement our efforts”).  Indeed, the SEC’s website goes so far as to advise 
potentially defrauded investors to “find out whether a private class action has been 
filed against the company you invested in,” and provides a link (labeled “private class 
action”) to the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse at 
http://securities.stanford.edu.  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investor Claims Funds, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). 
204 See Coffee, Securities Class Action, supra note 1, at 10 (citing the results of a study 
by Harvard Law Professor Howell Jackson showing that private securities class action 
settlements “averaged an annual aggregate amount (i.e., $1,906,333,333) exceeding 
the sum of all public monetary sanctions”); id. at 11 (presenting the results of a study 
by Cornerstone Research and concluding that “even in major scandals where the SEC 
has brought its own action, the damages paid in securities class actions are usually (but 
not always) a multiple of those paid to the SEC”). 
205 See supra note 203 (describing SEC and FTC reliance on private class actions as 
a supplemental enforcement technique).  As many commentators have suggested, pub-
lic enforcement agencies often lack the resources to rigorously investigate and enforce 
claims, and “may be constrained also by political influence” to ignore some claims.  
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15, at 69. 
206 We are not aware of any empirical work comparing the penalties meted out by 
public enforcement agencies to the settlements negotiated by the private class action 
bar in order to determine whether the former fails to effectively deter.  The closest we 
have seen is a study in which the authors reviewed 248 securities fraud class actions and 
found the private suits that paralleled SEC investigations and actions settled more 
quickly and for significantly more money than did the independent suits.  James D. 
Cox & Randall S. Thomas,  SEC Enforcement Actions for Financial Fraud and Private Litiga-
tion:  An Empirical Inquiry 16-19 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Pa-
per No. 03-08, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/absract_id=429140. 
207 Hensler & Rowe, supra note 41, at 137. 
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tions for summary judgment, and unsuccessful motions for class certi-
fication.208  Why should we assume that class action defendants are 
pushovers?  Meritless filings are not met with payoff money; they are 
met with motion practice,209 and sometimes sanctions.  Defendants 
not only fight back, they also ferret out fraud, as in the recent “Silica 
cases,” in which the defendants uncovered evidence that may yet land 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and medical experts in jail.210
The important point in all of this is not whether we are right or 
wrong in our assessment of whether current class action rules, in some 
general way, tend to overdeter.  While we may doubt that they do, the 
point here is only that these are the questions we should be asking 
whenever we examine particular rules, practices, and reform propos-
als in the class action arena. 
B.  The Underdeterrence Problem 
A more pressing concern is whether class actions underdeter:  
whether current rules prompt plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle for too little, 
so that defendants are not forced to internalize the full costs of their 
wrongdoing.  As we have already discussed, the major villain here is 
the lodestar cross-check, which undermines deterrence by driving at-
torneys to settle cases at settlement-incentive breakpoints that fall 
short of true settlement values. 
Other underdeterrence arguments are underwhelming.  The most 
prevalent relates to “the ability of defendants and the plaintiff’s attor-
208 See Silver, supra note 62, at 1399 (describing the incidence of class actions dis-
posed of through motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment); Willging et 
al., supra note 122, at 8 (summarizing data on class actions dismissed by summary 
judgment, motions to dismiss, or denial of class certification). 
209 We suspect this inclination to file motions is driven by a self-interested defense 
bar, which properly advises its client base that over the long haul, repeat defendants 
are better served by paying their lawyers to stand and fight rather than paying the 
plaintiffs to go away. 
210 In the Silica cases, see generally In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 
(S.D. Tex. 2005), headlines were made when a Texas judge overseeing “about 120 sili-
cosis suits involving some 10,000 plaintiffs” “accused doctors, screening companies and 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers of being involved in a ‘scheme’” to diagnose otherwise healthy 
plaintiffs with this lung-scarring disease.  Mary Alice Robins, U.S. House Committee Asks 
Texas Firms for Silicosis Suit Info, TEX. LAWYER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 4.  It was the defendants’ 
persistence and willingness to litigate the underlying medical issues that led to these 
discoveries.  In addition to an ongoing congressional investigation into the plaintiffs 
lawyers’ role, the defendants are also seeking steep sanctions for the filing of baseless 
litigation.  Id. 
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neys to arrange collusive settlements that exchange a low recovery for 
a high fee award.”211  The nub of this concern is that defendants, who 
“care only about the total amount they must pay out in settlement [of a 
common fund case], not how the payoff is distributed between class 
members and the class lawyer.”  Thus, defendants have a strong incen-
tive to offer class counsel a deal in which the defendants accede to in-
creased class counsel fees in return for the class counsel’s agreeing to a 
lower recovery for class members.
212
Or, in Professor Coffee’s more provocative prose:  “The ability of pri-
vate law enforcement to create a credible penalty structure is under-
cut if the private watchdog can be bought off by tossing him the juicy 
bone of a higher-than-ordinary fee award in return for his acceptance 
of an inadequate settlement.”213
This critique, however, is a canard; in reality, the defendants have 
no such “juicy bones” to toss to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.  While fee rules 
in common fund cases may differ across federal jurisdictions, not one 
district (to our knowledge) allows defendants and plaintiffs’ counsel 
to agree to the amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid out of the fund.  
Such a regime would be totally inconsistent with a lodestar, percent-
of-fund, or lodestar cross-check approach.  The reality is that class ac-
tion fees are set by courts, not by agreement between the parties.  Nor 
is there any merit to the notion that defendants are selling a promise 
to remain silent and not contest the fee application.  They will remain 
silent anyway.  They have no dog in that hunt. 
Underdeterrence remains a huge concern in several other areas 
of class action practice.  For instance, plaintiffs may sue for injunctive 
relief and damages and then collude with the defendant to settle the 
211 Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7, at 691. “At its worst, 
the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap settlement for a 
high award of attorney’s fees.”  Id. at 714; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 627 (5th ed. 1998) (“[T]he lawyer for the class will be tempted to of-
fer to settle . . . for a small judgment and a large legal fee, and such an offer will be at-
tractive to the defendant, provided the sum of the two figures is less than the defen-
dant’s net expected loss from going to trial.”). 
212 Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Cli-
ents or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 146-47 (2001) (quoting Susan P. Koniak & 
George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1111 (1996)).  The 
authors further assert that “[d]efendants and their lawyers in class action suits under-
stand the agency [cost] problem . . . and have every incentive to exploit it.”  Id. at 146. 
213 Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 34, at 226. 
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case for damages only.214  In many cases, defendants will pay dearly for 
this privilege because the injunction is what concerns them most 
(since it will end their ability to continue the lucrative but unlawful 
practice).  Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers will be quick to cut such 
a deal because injunctions do not contribute to the common fund, 
whereas money damages do.  Therefore, the one true lens of deter-
rence dictates that courts view with skepticism the abandonment of 
equitable claims in class settlement agreements. 
Another practice that raises serious underdeterrence concerns is 
the so-called “reverse auction” phenomenon.  Where multiple class 
actions are filed alleging the same wrongdoing against the same de-
fendant, there is an opportunity for the defendant to engage in a “re-
verse auction” by pitting plaintiffs’ firms against one another in hopes 
of achieving the cheapest and most comprehensive settlement.215  
Even if notice of the proposed settlement is given to all affected par-
ties, the effects are often perverse.  One reporter described the efforts 
of an attorney who spent “two years in a game of legal whack-a-mole, 
flying to courts in Florida, Illinois and Texas to beat back the settle-
ment offers that pop[ped] up [just as he had] an expensive [class ac-
214 Hantler and Norton observe that serious conflicts of interest occur “in non-
cash, or coupon class actions, [where] there often is no settlement fund or pool from 
which the plaintiffs’ lawyers can draw their contingency fee.”  Hantler & Norton, supra 
note 52, at 1356.  They suggest that the “most sensible approach for companies to take 
with non-cash settlements . . . is to negotiate the benefit to the plaintiff class with the 
plaintiffs’ attorney first, and then insist that the judge overseeing the litigation deter-
mine the attorneys’ fees after the final settlement is presented to the court.”  Id. at 
1356-57. 
215 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars:  The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370 (1995) (“The first team to settle with the defendants in ef-
fect precludes the others (who may have originated the action and litigated it with suf-
ficient skill and zeal that the defendants were eager to settle with someone else).”); see 
also Charles Toutant, KPMG Pact Gets Conditional Nod, but Rival Plaintiffs’ Firms Press On, 
182 N.J. L.J. 561 (2005) (describing efforts by three plaintiffs’ class action firms to dis-
qualify Milberg Weiss as lead counsel on the grounds that it engaged in a reverse auc-
tion with defendants that eviscerated their pending class actions for too low a settle-
ment); Pamela A. MacLean, You’ve Got Trouble, NAT’L L.J., reprinted in CORP. COUNS. 
MAG., Sept. 2005, at 142 (reporting that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers federally en-
joined a $25 million state court-approved settlement of a class action against America 
Online on the grounds that the settling attorneys cooperated with the defendants in a 
reverse auction); Justin Scheck, Reverse Auctions Have No Class:  Lawyers Square Off with 
Firms Trying To Undercut Settlements, THE RECORDER (S.F.), July 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.gdblegal.com/press.php?menuItem=5&article=46 (citing ethics expert 
Joseph McMonigle, who stated that “competing filings can allow defendants to pick the 
plaintiff with the weakest case.  With weaker opposition . . . defense lawyers have more 
leverage to reach a cheap settlement”). 
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tion] case headed to trial.”216  Certainly, the enactment of CAFA will 
reduce the incidence of these types of deals by forcing many class ac-
tions into federal courts, where the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation will consolidate like claims in a single jurisdiction.217  But to 
the extent that CAFA does not terminate this practice, it is certainly 
appropriate for courts, applying the one true lens of deterrence, to 
evince great skepticism of any settlement resulting from a reverse auc-
tion process. 
CONCLUSION 
Even as economic analysis has come to dominate the class action 
arena, we have lost sight of Richard Posner’s 1972 observation, regard-
ing class actions, that “the most important point, on an economic 
analysis, is that the violator be confronted with the costs of his viola-
tion—this achieves the allocative purpose of the suit—not that he pays 
them to his victims.”218  As a corollary, the vast contemporary literature 
of class actions (and, for that matter, the work of Congress and the 
courts) fails entirely to appreciate the concrete public policy implica-
tions of the one true normative polestar here:  the forced internaliza-
tion of social costs. 
One interesting question is why the competing normative polestar 
of class member compensation is so pervasive in the academic litera-
ture, popular press, and halls of Congress.  The answer may be a 
moral discomfort with entrepreneurial wealth-creation by plaintiffs’ 
class action lawyers.  If we strip away concerns with class member 
compensation, then current policies (for example, the lodestar cross-
check, or rules disallowing percentage-based fee awards on cy pres dis-
tributions) would have to be justified on other grounds.  We suspect 
that even the most earnest scholars are uncomfortable arguing that 
216 Scheck, supra note 215. 
217 See J. Douglas Richards, What Makes an Antitrust Remedy Successful?:  A Tale of Two 
Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 621, 656 (2005) (predicting that CAFA “should reduce the 
frequency of ‘reverse auctions’ . . . since most antitrust class actions that were previ-
ously brought in state court may now proceed together in federal court. . . . [This] also 
should . . . mak[e] it easier to obtain class certification of multistate antitrust class ac-
tions in federal courts”); T.R. Goldman, Class Menagerie, LEGAL TIMES, reprinted in 
CORP. COUNS. MAG., Apr. 2005, at 72 (observing that because CAFA forces class actions 
into federal court “there will be fewer chances for companies to work the so-called re-
verse auction, which allows defendants to play one set of plaintiffs off another in order 
to achieve the lowest settlement price”). 
218 POSNER, supra note 22, at 349-50. 
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some inherent moral value compels otherwise arbitrary limitations on 
attorney compensation.  It is only natural, then, that they should fall 
back upon the norm of protecting class member compensation. 
Another reason for the primacy of compensation concerns, in cer-
tain circles, is plain old-fashioned hypocrisy.  Corporate lobbyists and 
conservative commentators regularly purport to stand up for the right 
of absent class members to receive money damages by advocating 
rules that would severely limit the fees of class counsel.219  One could 
be forgiven, however, for suspecting that the real motivation of corpo-
rate advocates is not plaintiffs’ rights, but rather (1) to diminish both 
the absolute number and efficacy of class actions by making them less 
attractive investment opportunities to effective entrepreneurial law-
yers;220 and (2) to diminish the wealth and influence of plaintiffs’ class 
action lawyers, who not only comprise the most effective lobbying 
counterweight to corporate interests in contemporary politics, but 
who use their wealth to finance further class action litigation against 
U.S. companies.221
Whatever the reason, as we have demonstrated, the orthodox im-
perative to reduce agency costs and protect class member compensa-
tion has ushered in a blizzard of bad policy choices.  These choices 
undercut the deterrent value of class actions at practically every turn:  
from the rules for setting attorneys fees, to the standards we employ 
for approving settlements, to the way we evaluate waivers of the right 
219 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act Hearing, supra note 79, at 38 (testimony of John 
Beisner) (testifying in support of CAFA on the grounds that legislation would curb 
those “circumstances in which counsels walk off with enormous attorneys’ fees but the 
class members receive next to nothing”). 
220 See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Be-
tween People’s Ears:”  Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
453, 453 (2000) (noting that contemporary litigation reformers want “[m]ore than just 
the formal legal changes”:  they want to alter “the cultural environment surrounding 
civil litigation” by influencing the way the public responds to what “plaintiffs and their 
lawyers[] do with regard to naming and blaming”). 
221 See CRIER, supra note 53, at 193 (observing that, “[u]sing attorneys’ fees earned 
in similar litigation, these industrious ‘tort kings’ bankroll the next generation of class 
action lawsuits”); GOULDEN, supra note 113, at xiii (observing that class action lawyers 
take their settlement proceeds and “turn around and invest in new ‘liability areas’—
that is, areas they can exploit for even more lawsuits”); John T. Nockleby & Shannon 
Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict:  The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1021, 1021-22 (2005) (remarking that contemporary reformers have “made the 
strategic choice to politicize” their reformist campaign “in a very public effort to un-
dermine the civil justice system” by torpedoing, among others, “lawyers [who] foment 
excessive litigation”). 
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to seek class-wide relief.  On virtually every issue, scholars and policy-
makers have been asking all the wrong questions.  At best, in this Arti-
cle, we have scratched the surface of a discourse that asks the right 
questions and which evaluates class action practices against a measur-
ing stick of deterrence, unadulterated by the contemporary obsession 
with agency costs or solicitude for the compensatory interests of disin-
terested class members in small-claims class actions. 
 
